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Abstract 
This master thesis aims to explain the association between changes in credit ratings and 
stock returns. In efficient markets, all pricing relevant information is discounted in the stock 
price. Hence, stock prices will not react to credit rating announcements unless the 
announcement conveys new information. I assess the information content of credit ratings by 
measuring the abnormal stock returns associated with credit rating announcements. 
Abnormal returns are calculated relative to two expected returns models, (i) the market 
adjusted return model and (ii) the market model.  
I found that both upgrades and downgrades yield significant cumulative abnormal returns. 
Downgrades are significant on the announcement day and the pre/post-event day, in the pre-
event window and the post-event window. Upgrades are significant on the announcement 
day and the pre/post-event day. Hence, it is evident that credit ratings do indeed convey new 
information to the capital markets. The results were not altered by choice of expectation 
model. Firms with a high current ratio experience less negative abnormal returns in case of 
downgrades on the event day. In the case of upgrades I found that firms with a higher debt-
to-asset ratio experience less positive abnormal returns on the announcement day.  
Changes in credit rating yields more negative abnormal returns for firms which are 
downgraded to non-investment grade, compared to firms which are not reclassified. This is 
especially evident in the post-event window. Reclassification did not yield any significant 
results for upgrades. Furthermore, this study shows that non-investment grade firms 
experience significantly more negative abnormal returns in case of downgrades, compared to 
investment-grade firms. The results are highly significant for all event windows except the 
post-event window.  
In order to explain abnormal returns, I used a multiple regression model based on the 
aforementioned variables (leverage, reclassification, (non)-investment grade) and a control 
variable to account for market anticipation. By controlling for all the explanatory variables, I 
found that the current ratio had a significant effect on downgrades on the announcement day. 
Moreover, credit rating announcements which were not anticipated yielded cumulative 
abnormal returns on the pre/post-event day. In general, the multiple regressions model seems 
to perform poorly when it comes to upgrades. 
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Preface 
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) have obtained massive media coverage since the onset of the 
financial crisis. The CRAs received considerable criticism in the years following the crisis 
and investors, regulators and the business community have questioned the role of rating 
agencies in the market turmoil. One example that underpins the critique is that the CRAs 
were responsible for contributing to the housing bubble in the US by awarding AAA rating 
to complex, unsafe asset backed securities and other derivatives. This is clearly a subject of 
public interest, as credit ratings (or the lack of appropriate ratings) could cause a tremendous 
impact on the economy. This triggered my interest for the CRAs and the credit rating 
process. As I have gained more knowledge of the credit rating process, I have been 
increasingly motivated to learn more about the information content of credit rating 
announcements and whether or not they affect stock returns. This paper is motivated by the 
question; 
Do credit rating agencies provide new information to the capital markets? 
This thesis is a sole authorship however, I would like to express my gratitude towards those 
who have supported me during the work and made valuable contributions to this master 
thesis. First and foremost I would like to thank professor Tore Leite for his guidance and 
insightful thoughts on credit ratings and event study methodology. Second, I thank Eirik 
Nerheim and Skjalg Y. Thomassen for being such good friends and for their feedback and 
advice regarding this thesis. Special thanks also go to my family whom I love very much. 
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1. Introduction 
Credit ratings reflect the likelihood of default on a continuous basis. Rating categories, on 
the other hand, are discrete. They do not change on a timely basis like stock prices because 
they are supposed to reflect the long term creditworthiness of the issuer. Credit ratings 
should not react to any change in market conditions unless the change will affect the firm’s 
ability to repay its debt and interests. On the contrary, in efficient markets stock prices will 
immediately reflect all new information. Hence, the interesting question is whether all 
pricing relevant information is already incorporated in the stock price at the time of a credit 
rating announcement. This is important because it has implications for market efficiency, 
security valuation and public policies. In that sense, this paper is a test of the efficient market 
hypothesis. This master thesis applies event study methodology in order to assess the effect 
of credit rating announcements on stock returns. The event study methodology is favourable 
in this context because it can be used to evaluate the impact of company policies on firm 
value. To my knowledge, no research has been done on the combined Scandinavian stock 
market (only individual countries). Hence this study contributes to the empirical research on 
credit ratings and stock returns.  
The credit rating agencies use publically available information when they conduct the credit 
rating process. There is one source of information, however, that is not always publically 
available, namely data from meetings or conversations with the debt issuer. This means that 
when a credit rating agency announces a change in credit rating, this may contain 
information not previously known to the public. According to the efficient market hypothesis 
(Fama, 1970), one would not expect stock prices to react to a change in credit rating unless 
the announcement conveys new information. The literature on this topic is ambiguous, and 
the empirical results are contradictory. However, the general perception is that credit rating 
announcements do convey new information to the market (Hand, Holthausen, & Leftwich, 
1992 ). Furthermore, the direction of the effect is disputable. Theories have been set forth 
(Merton 1974) suggesting a transfer of wealth between bond- and stockholders as risk is 
revised up (downgrade) or down (upgrade). Contradictory theories with respect to the stock 
price effect of upgrades and downgrades make this an interesting topic for further study. 
However, the majority of studies find that credit rating downgrades are associated with 
negative abnormal return.  
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I measure abnormal returns relative to two models, (i) the adjusted return model and (ii) the 
market model. I specify three event windows,         ,          and         , in addition to 
the announcement day,   . Different event windows are used to gauge the efficiency of the 
markets. The t-statistics is used to test whether the cumulative abnormal returns over the 
event window is significantly different from zero.  
The most influential paper on capital structure and firms value (Modigliani & Miller, 1958 ) 
states that the firm value is independent of the capital structure, that is, in perfect capital 
markets. Leverage is one of the most important determinants for credit rating and previous 
research suggests that highly leveraged firms experience a more significant stock price 
reaction to credit rating downgrades than do less leveraged firms. Theory and empiricism do, 
once again, contradict each other. I assess whether it is a relationship between capital 
structure and abnormal returns. That is, contingent on the firm being upgraded or 
downgraded, does capital structure explain the magnitude of abnormal returns? I 
operationalize this by constructing a variable for net debt-to-assets and for the current ratio. 
Then I run regressions of cumulative abnormal returns on the independent variables. Stock 
prices are inherently forward looking, in that they reflect the present value of future cash 
flows. Failing to control for anticipation would influence the results. Consequently, the 
information content of credit rating is contingent on the availability of information. I use a 
dummy variable to account for warnings of possible rating changes via additions to the S&P 
CreditWatch List. I do a separate examination of credit rating preceded by positive, neutral 
or negative outlooks.  
Government regulators and corporate policies rely heavily on credit ratings. Many market 
participants and institutional investors are prohibited from investing in the securities of non-
investment grade firms. Moreover, the rating affects the conditions and costs under which 
firms access debt markets; hence the credit rating is closely linked to the debt cost of capital. 
Consequently, the divide between investment grade and non-investment grade is of special 
interest. I investigate whether there are any differences between downgrades or upgrades, 
contingent on the firm being classified as either investment grade or non-investments grade. 
By using two-sample t-tests I assess differences between the two groups. Moreover, I test 
whether the reclassification from investments grade to non-investment grade, or vice versa, 
yields abnormal returns.  
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1.1 Outline 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I outline the history of 
credit rating agencies and their present role in the financial markets. I describe the credit 
rating process, the methods used, and the information contained in credit ratings. Section 3 
presents the theoretical framework which helps contextualise the research on the effect of 
credit ratings on stock returns. These theories evolve around the information content of 
credit ratings, the wealth redistribution theory and the association between capital structure 
and the effect of credit rating announcements. Section 4 provides a description of the 
empirical research methodology, the design of the study and the data sample. Furthermore, it 
describes how the data has been processed and which statistical tests have been used. Section 
5 provides the results from the tests and includes a discussion of the results and their 
implications. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
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2. The Credit Rating Agencies 
2.1 The History of Credit Rating Agencies 
The credit rating agencies (henceforth CRAs) have a long history in the financial markets 
with traces all the way back to the latter part of the 19
th
 century. The first CRAs emerged in 
the US as a response to the increased interest for investing in railroads. Railroad construction 
and development swiftly became the most capital-intensive industry in the US, and the need 
for investors to support the rapid expansion fostered growth in the capital markets. However, 
“railroad information” to the investors was very limited, thus creating a new business 
opportunity of gathering, processing and distributing information. Henry Varnum Poor was 
the first one to capitalize on this new business model in 1860, and it started out as a “user-
pay” revenue model in that investors paid to receive the information (Sylla, 2001). 
Soon after other providers of railroad information entered the market. One of them was 
Luther Lee Blake who established Standard Statistical Bureau in 1906. In 1941 Poor merged 
with Standard and are today known as Standard & Poor’s Corporation. Another pioneer, 
John Moody, joined the party in 1909 and was the first to assign letter grades to companies 
and their securities in a declining order of credit quality. John Knowles Fitch was yet another 
player who established Fitch Publishing Company in 1913. Fitch introduced the now 
familiar AAA through D ratings scale that ultimately became the benchmark for credit rating 
agencies (Moody's Investors Service, 2002). 
The CRAs have evolved tremendously since their inception and are now considered one of 
the most important financial institutions. The decisive moment for the CRAs was the stock 
market crash in 1929. The crash and the following economic consequences led to requests 
for more regulations of the financial markets and an urge for “safety”. Regulators began 
placing heavy emphasis on CRAs’ credit ratings, e.g. the Federal Reserve, individual states 
and fund managers. Consequently, the CRAs became elevated from information brokers to 
unofficial gatekeepers to the financial markets, and their “approval” became the ticket to the 
capital markets. The CRA industry benefited from both selling information and the rating of 
securities. In the 1970s the industry had transformed completely from a “user-pay” system to 
an “issuer-pay” system. The creation of “National Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations” (NRSRO) by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) helped to 
further manifest the CRAs’ position. In addition, the SEC has refused to qualify most 
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agencies that have applied for NRSRO status, which in turn has enhanced the position of the 
“big three” rating agencies. As of today, Moody’s, Standard & Poor and Fitch dominate 95% 
- 98% of securities rating, and the remaining is shared between seven minor players. 
However, the market is mainly dominated by the two first agencies, and Fitch’s share of the 
market is significantly less than that of its two main rivals (Sylla, 2001).  
2.2 The Credit Rating Industry as of Today 
The CRAs have specialized in analysing and evaluating the future relative creditworthiness 
of sovereign and corporate issuers of debt securities. Their opinion is derived by 
fundamental credit analysis and expressed by the familiar AAA–C symbol system. The 
rating symbols strive to reflect an objective, consistent and simple measure of instruments 
and securities. The objective is to report the likelihood that debt will be repaid in a timely 
manner, thereby contributing to transparency and integrated financial markets (Moody`s 
Investors Service, 2002). Ratings constitute opinions, not buy and sell recommendations, or 
whether the investment is suitable for an investor. The credit rating does not provide 
guidance on other aspects essential for investment decisions, and bonds with the same rating 
may have very different market prices. The fact that CRAs do not provide investment 
recommendations has shielded them from investor legislation and, until recently, prevented 
direct regulation of their operations. The U.S. regulators have relied heavily on the CRAs as 
a basis for setting regulatory policies. By incorporating credit ratings into their policy 
making, the CRAs have received significant market recognition and credit ratings are now 
essential for all who wishes to enter the capital markets (The World Bank, 2009). 
Credit ratings are used in the market for a variety of applications. For example, they are 
crucial for banks in determining their capital requirements under Basel II, in that the ratings 
may be used to assign the risk weights for minimum capital charges for different categories 
of borrowers. Furthermore, ratings are regularly used in security selection and portfolio 
composition by pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, and brokers by 
restricting or prohibiting the purchase of bonds with a low credit rating (SEC, 2003). Credit 
ratings are also used in portfolio governance, in performance attribution, in the regulation of 
financial markets and institutions, and in financial contracts and covenants (Moody‘s 
Investor Service, 2003). 
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Consequently, rating changes can have substantial economic consequences for a variety of 
debt issuers and investors. A change in credit rating from investments grade to non-
investment grade may have significant consequences, as investors who are committed to 
mandates could be forced to rebalance their portfolios, thus resulting in downward pressure 
on bond prices. Moreover, the rating affects the conditions and costs under which firms 
access debt markets; hence, the credit rating is closely linked to the debt cost of capital. The 
CRAs help to mitigate the asymmetric information between lenders (investors) and 
borrowers (issuers) by assessing the creditworthiness of the latter. Hence they contribute to 
solving the principal-agent problems. In addition, it reduces investor’s cost of gauging the 
creditworthiness of a security or issuer, thereby increasing overall market efficiency 
(Moody's Investors Service, 2002). 
2.3 The Credit Rating Process, Definitions and Methods 
Credit ratings express forward looking opinions regarding the creditworthiness of issuers and 
issues. The term creditworthiness refers to the likelihood of an issuer to make timely 
payments of interest and principal, in accordance with its contractual terms, but it is not an 
absolute measure of default probability (S&P Global Credit Portal, 2009). A credit rating 
embodies multiple factors that compose the overall assessment of creditworthiness. Besides 
the likelihood of default, it also encompasses payment priority, recovery and credit stability. 
The CRAs do not have a “formula” for combining various factors, and the relative 
importance of the factors may vary between types of securities, firms and industries, 
between regions, currencies and different situations. Hence, the CRAs must use a great deal 
of subjective judgement during the credit rating process. Furthermore, the rating symbols are 
intended to reflect the same general level of creditworthiness for issuers and issues 
regardless of different sectors, industries, and at different times (S&P Global Credit Portal, 
2009).  
The primary factor for assessing creditworthiness is the likelihood of default. The two major 
agencies define default as, “missed or delayed disbursement of interest and/or principal” 
(Moody‘s) and “first occurrence of a payment default on any financial obligation” (S&P). 
The CRAs do not attach specific probabilities of default to each rating category. On the 
contrary, they form views about the likelihood of plausible scenarios and outcomes in order 
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to make qualified estimates of creditworthiness. In general, issuers or issues with a higher 
credit rating should default less frequently than issuers or issues with lower ratings. 
The CRAs assess multiple secondary credit factors during the credit rating process. One such 
factor is the projected recovery rate in case of default (loss given default). This is obviously 
of interest to creditors and differs greatly between industries. Another secondary factor is 
payment priority for firms that issue both senior/subordinate and secured/unsecured debt. A 
third factor is credit stability, which is a measure of how vulnerable the issuer is to sudden 
deterioration or default. While most firms display a period of gradual decay before they 
default, others may not give any warning at all. Other secondary factors which are associated 
with default and recovery rate are leverage, coverage, liquidity or profitability (Moody`s 
Investor Service, 2006). Besides hard facts and numbers, the CRAs also evaluate the 
management and its corporate governance. The management could be of significant 
importance with respect to credit rating, as default could result not only from a firm’s lack of 
repayment capacity but also from willingness to honour its obligations. Furthermore, high 
probability of default may tempt the management to sub-optimize, thereby exploiting debt 
holders. The CRAs are important financial market participants by acting as vehicles for 
greater transparency and disclosure. Hence, it is vital to understand how the CRAs arrive at 
the ratings, what they entail, and why they are changed. Investors want ratings to reflect the 
issuer’s relative fundamental credit risk, i.e. measure intrinsic financial strength. Moreover, 
they desire stability in credit ratings, and they believe that changes in ratings increase 
volatility (Moody's Investors Service, 2002). Because credit ratings affect both investor’s 
and issuer’s behaviour and thinking, stable ratings are highly valued by the market 
participants.  
The fact that about 98 percent of all large corporate bond issues are rated by at least one 
rating agency (these ratings are costly) underpins the importance of credit ratings. The 
emphasis on credit ratings obliges the CRAs to promote transparency and to minimize any 
misunderstandings about what they do. Moody’s is aware that their ratings can become self-
fulfilling prophesies. According to Moody’s Investor Service (2006, p.4) upgrades can mean 
“greater capital market access and interest cost savings for issuers, and improved security 
prices for investors”. Moreover, downgrades can mean “higher capital costs for issuers, and 
portfolio turnover and losses for investors”.  
S&P and Moody’s follow a very similar format and the assessed creditworthiness is reported 
by assigning one of the letters, AAA through D: 
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Moody‘s: Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, Caa, Ca, C and D 
S&P: AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC, CC, C and D 
AAA (Aaa) is the highest rating, representing minimum credit risk, and there is an inverse 
relationship between credit rating and likelihood of default. Ratings from AAA (Aaa) to 
BBB (Baa) are classified as investment grade. An obligor rated AAA–AA has a very strong 
capacity to meet their financial commitments. A–BBB issuers have strong/adequate capacity 
to meet its financial obligations, but are somewhat more susceptible to adverse changes in 
the economy, which may deteriorate their financial capacity. An obligor rated BB (Ba)-CC 
(Ca) is classified as non-investment grade (or speculative grade/junk-bonds/high-yield 
bonds). BB is regarded as having the least degree of speculation and CC has the most 
significant speculative aspects. While non-investment grade credit ratings may have some 
quality and protective characteristics, these might be outweighed by high uncertainty and/or 
major exposure to adverse conditions. C is the lowest rated class and is typically in default, 
with little prospect of recovery of principal or interests. D rating is assigned when a default 
is believed to be a general default and the issuer will fail to pay all or substantial parts of its 
obligations (S&P Global Credit Portal, 2009). For more refined ratings, Moody’s uses 1, 2 
and 3, while S&P uses + and – signs. Moreover, S&P capitalizes all the letters, while 
Moody’s uses lowercase after the main rating letter. For example, S&P rating BBB+ is 
equivalent to Moody’s Baa1, and S&P BB- is equivalent to Moody’s Ba3.     
Credit ratings are at their core forward-looking, and the CRAs constantly monitor their 
ratings. Hence, they should not react to any change in market conditions, unless they 
perceive that the change will affect the firm’s ability to repay its debt and interest. Many 
financial participants rely on the CRAs credit ratings. Thus, a challenge for the CRAs is to 
increase the information content of ratings without adding unnecessarily to market volatility. 
Besides the credit rating announcements itself, the CRAs also have other non-rating signals 
to convey information to the market such as outlooks and reviews. Outlooks give an opinion 
regarding the likely direction of any rating actions over the medium-term and are expressed 
as positive, stable or negative. If changing market conditions challenge the current rating, the 
CRAs can place the rating under review. S&P, Moody’s and Fitch each have their own 
review of credit ratings, named CreditWatch, Watchlist and Rating Watch, respectively. 
Ratings that are placed under watch are assigned into one of the following categories, 
positive, negative or developing/uncertain/evolving, until the CRA has determined whether 
the risk is still consistent with the assigned rating. Historically, 66%-76% of all ratings have 
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been changed in the same direction as indicated by the review and rarely in the opposite 
direction (Moody's Investors Service, 2002).  
The rating process is initiated by the CRAs forming a committee. The committee consists of 
a managing director, a lead analyst and a sufficient number of other members needed to 
perform the rating. The size of the committee may depend on the size of the issuer, the 
complexity of the securities, etc. All discussions and exchange of information between the 
committee and the management is strictly confidential (Moody`s Investor Service, 2006). 
The analysts utilize all relevant sources of information in order to derive the appropriate 
rating. Sources of information may include public available data (e.g. annual reports, 
prospectuses, offering memoranda), market data (e.g. stock price, volume, bond spreads etc), 
economic data from industry groups, associations, bodies or agencies and discussions with 
expert sources in the industry, government or academia (Moody`s Investor Service, 2006). 
The CRAs are also provided with detailed inside information during the rating process, e.g. 
five-year forecasts, pro-forma statements, and internal reports (Kliger & Sarig, 2000 ). 
The CRAs strive to disclose the results of credit rating analysis, first to the issuer and 
banker, and second, to the market. They endeavour to explain the rationale for ratings as 
clearly as possible, subject to the confidentiality of non-public information disclosed to the 
CRAs by the issuer. The CRAs’ primary objective is to produce ratings that are accurate and 
stable measures of creditworthiness. Accuracy may be measured in terms of cumulative 
accuracy profiles and accuracy ratios. It could also be measured as default rates and the 
average rating of defaulting issuers prior to their default. Rating stability is best measured in 
terms of (i) frequency of rating changes, (ii) frequency of large rating changes and (iii) 
frequency of rating reversals. It could be a trade-off between accuracy and stability. For 
example, by reacting more aggressively to new information, one could increase the short-
term correlation between ratings and defaults. On the other hand, ratings will become more 
volatile to new information, thus reducing stability (Moody`s Investor Service, 2003, April).  
The CRAs attempt to counter the problem that the current rating may not always reflect 
potential changes in the issuer’s credit rating, by providing the market non-rating signals in 
the form of rating outlooks and reviews. By doing so, they can keep investors informed 
regarding the issuer’s current financial stability and outlooks, without adding unnecessarily 
to market volatility. 
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3. Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis 
3.1 The Information Content of Rating Change 
Announcements 
Eugene Fama (1970) defined an efficient market as “a market in which prices always fully 
reflect available information”. He put forth the efficient market hypothesis, which states that 
security prices could adjust in accordance with three information subsets, namely weak, 
semi-strong-, and strong form of market efficiency.  Fama shows that markets are at least 
weak form efficient, in that one could not expect to earn excess returns based on historical 
prices. He also finds support of semi-strong market efficiency, which means that prices are 
assumed to fully reflect all obviously publicly available information. Strong-form of market 
efficiency assumes that all available information, even private information, is reflected in 
security prices. This is, according to Fama (1970), a very strict assumption, and the strong-
form efficient markets model is best viewed as a benchmark against which deviations from 
market efficiency can be judged.  
The CRAs have, through the credit rating process, access to non-public private information. 
This information is, in addition to all other available sources of information, utilized by the 
CRAs in order to form an opinion regarding the issuer’s creditworthiness.  The fact that 
CRAs have access to insider’s information creates asymmetry between CRAs and the 
market. If stock prices react to credit rating announcements, it implies that the CRAs convey 
new information. On the other hand, if stock prices do not react to changes in credit rating, it 
means that the stock market has already absorbed this information and it is discounted into 
the stock price. This motivates the investigation of the information content of credit ratings. 
Systematically nonzero abnormal stock returns following a change in credit rating are 
inconsistent with market efficiency. The research on the effect of credit rating 
announcements on stock returns could thus be thought of as a test on strong-form market 
efficiency.   
Extensive research has been done on the information content of credit rating announcements. 
According to Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), early papers by Pinches and Singleton (1978) 
and Weinstein (1977) find no significant effect of credit rating announcements on stock 
returns. Successive research by Griffin and Sanvicente (1982) and Wansley and Clauretie 
(1985) however, provide evidence of abnormal stock price behaviour after credit rating 
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announcements. The absence of significant results in prior research could be due to the fact 
that they base the research on monthly and/or weekly data. The use of daily data is 
favourable to isolate the effect of the announcement on stock prices (Hand, Holthausen, & 
Leftwich, 1992 ).    
Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) find evidence that downgrades by both Moody’s and 
Standard and Poor’s are associated with negative abnormal stock returns. This supports the 
argument that the rating agencies provide information to the capital markets through a 
downgrade or that downgrades impose higher costs to the firms, effectively increasing its 
marginal cost of debt. They find little evidence in support of abnormal returns related to 
upgrades. Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992) find evidence that there are both bond and 
stock price effects associated with announcements of rating changes by Moody’s and 
Standard and Poor’s. They find a significant negative relationship between rating downgrade 
announcements and stock returns. However, the results are not significant with respect to 
rating upgrade announcements.  
Hsueh and Liu (1992) suggest that the conflicting empirical results in previous studies are 
due to failure to controll for anticipation. In other words, the content of credit ratings should 
not be treated as homogenous regardless of firm and time. Rather, one must take into 
account the availability of information in the market prior to the rating announcement. Firm-
specific information is more readily available for some firms than for others due to differing 
coverage by the press, financial analysts etc., and investors are more likely to anticipate the 
rating change on firms they have more information about. Consequently, the information 
content of credit ratings is more significant for firms in which information is relatively 
limited. In other words, the stock price reaction to credit rating announcements is contingent 
on the market’s anticipation. Hsueh and Liu (1992) also show that the effect of a rating 
change is more pronounced during periods of high market uncertainty.  
A study by Kliger and Sarig (2000 p.2899) claims that there is a generaly accepted rationale 
for why rating information is valuable, namely because “issuers disclose inside information 
to raters, who assign ratings that reflect this information without fully disclosing the specific 
underlying details to the public at large”.  
Subsequently, the relevant question to ask is whether this information is pricing relevant and 
useful. This question has been subject to research, without any uniform answer. Kliger and 
Sarig (2000) found a method to isolate the price reactions to rating changes that exclusively 
reflected rating information. Prior to 1982 Moody’s had a broader rating classification 
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without numerical modifiers, which on April 26 was changed into a finer rating partition. 
This allowed for an examination of the information that Moody’s ratings sends investors 
regarding creditworthiness because the fine ratings assigned that day were based on the same 
information that underlies the preceding ratings. The refinement is therefore perfectly suited 
to isolate the information content of credit ratings, as it simply provides information in a 
striktly finer partition than before (Kliger & Sarig, 2000 ). Their conclusion is that rating 
information is indeed valuable and that both bond prices and stock prices adjusted to the new 
information.   
3.2 The Wealth Redistribution Hypothesis 
Although the majority of studies find a negative relationship between bond rating 
downgrades and stock prices, Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) argue that downgrades are 
not necessary bad for stockholders. More specifically, if a downgrade occurs because the 
firm is taking on more debt, it may in fact transfer wealth from bondholders to stockholders, 
also known as asset substitution or the wealth redistribution hypothesis (Berk & DeMarzo, 
2007).  
Robert Merton (1974) has proposed a method for pricing the firm’s equity using option 
pricing theory. He consider the firm’s equity (E) as a European call option on the firm’s 
assets (V) with a strike price equal to the face value of debt (D) and maturity date (T) equal 
to the maturity of the debt. In other words,                , which looks like a call 
option. It can be shown from the Black-Merton-Scholes option pricing formula that the value 
of a call option increases with the volatility of the firm‘s assets. Consequently, a firm which 
takes on more debt incurs greater volatility in its cash flows and increases the value of the 
call option. Greater volatility raises the likelihood of an extremely good outcome for equity 
holders without increasing the downside, as the value of their shares cannot drop below zero. 
Bondholders, on the other hand, can be thought of as “owners” of the firm’s assets, having 
written a call option on them to the equity holders. They have a fixed claim on the firm and 
do not benefit as the firm takes on more risk. This theory could be used to argue why 
downgrades are not necessary bad for stockholders and why one could actually expect a 
positive stock price reaction from a credit rating downgrade.         
Holthausen and Letwich (1986) and Goh and Ederington (1993) observed significant returns 
prior to announcements, indicating some anticipation. As the credit rating agencies publish a 
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short explanation for their credit rating announcement, Goh and Ederington (1993) 
hypothesize that the market reaction will be contingent on this reason. They argue that one 
could not expect to find a significant negative stock reaction for all downgrades, because an 
anticipated transfer of wealth from bondholders to stockholders should be good news for 
stockholders. Consequently, a credit rating downgrade could call for a positive stock price 
reaction.  
As mentioned, most studies find a significant negative relationship between rating 
downgrade announcements and stock returns. However, the results are not significant with 
respect to rating upgrade announcements. This is a puzzling result, as there is no a priori 
rationale why only downgrades should have an impact on stock prices (Hsueh & Liu, 1992 ). 
The implication of Mertons’ theory is of theoretical and practical interest. It illustrates that 
the rationale behind a change in credit rating is of both statistical and economic interest, and 
it provides an explanation for why downgrades are not necessarily bad for stockholders. 
Furthermore, it might help explain why previous studies find no significant equity reaction 
to upgrades. Goh and Ederington (1993) investigates whether the rationale behind a change 
in credit rating is relevant for the stock price reaction i.e. whether the change is related to 
firm-sepecific news (e.g. leverage, earnings, margins) or whether it relates to general market 
conditions (e.g. contraction, deteriorating market conditions).  
They put forth the conjecture that previous studies may have failed to find a significant 
association between credit rating upgrades and stock returns because they fail to recognize 
the rationale behind the change in credit rating. More specifically, they argue that firm-
specific news must be decomposed into upgrades (downgrades) that are due to (i) an 
improvement (deterioration) in the firm’s financial prospects and (ii) a decrease (increase) in 
leverage (Goh & Ederington, 1993 ). The former reason will have a positive impact on the 
stock price, while the latter one could have the opposite effect. These two underlying reasons 
have, offseting effects, which might explain the non-significant equity reaction to upgrades.  
They find that, as expected from previous studies, the market reacts negatively to downgrade 
announcements. Furthermore, they find that these downgrades are generally based on 
projections of the firm’s future financial prospects and therefore are likely to entail 
significant information. On the contrary, announcements of downgrades related to increased 
levels of debt (e.g. due to leveraged buyouts, debt-financed expansion etc) are small and 
insignificant, suggesting that these downgrades are either anticipated by the market or have 
less interest to stockholders (Goh & Ederington, 1993 ). They do not find any significant 
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association between upgrades and stock returns after a decomposition based on the 
underlying reason, i.e. financial prospects or leverage. The important insight, however, is 
that rating changes cannot be treated as homogeneous, and the rationale behind the change in 
credit rating must be considered.      
Kliger and Sarig (2000), on the other hand, provide evidence in support of the asset-
substitution theory. They find that shareholders lose when risk is revised downward i.e. a 
credit rating upgrade, while bondholders benefit from reduced risk assesments. Moreover, 
implied volatility derived from the prices of options on the stock decline following 
announcements of better than expected ratings. Kliger and Sarig (2000) find that rating 
information is relevant for the valuation of debt and equity respectively but do not find that it 
impacts the combined value of the firm. This implies that a change in credit rating only 
transfers wealth between stock- and bondholders. Hsueh and Liu (1992) also find significant 
stock price reactions to rating upgrades after controlling for anticipation. Firms that investors 
have less information about prior the the announcement exert a positive stock price reaction 
from rating upgrades.  
The redistribution hypothesis is of interest with regard to credit rating announcements 
because it challanges the more intuitive explanations about the association between credit 
rating downgrades and negative stock returns. It provides a theoretical, sound explanation for 
why downgrades could in fact provoke a positive stock price reaction. However, despite its 
theoretical justification, most empirical research seems to agree that the market reacts 
negatively to downgrade announcements (Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Hand, 
Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992), Goh & Ederington (1993)). Credit rating upgrades, on the 
other hand, are more disputable. Kliger and Sarig (2000) find evidence in support of the 
wealth redistribution theory that shareholders lose when risk is revised downward. On the 
contrary, Hsueh and Liu (1992) find that upgrades are associated with a positive stock price 
reaction. Based on previous research, I would assume similar results in my data sample, i.e. a 
negative stock price reaction to downgrades (credit ratings convey new information to the 
market/ no redistribution of wealth) but no significant reaction to upgrades.  
           : Credit rating downgrades have a negative effect on stock returns. 
           : Credit rating upgrades have no effect on stock returns. 
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3.3 Capital Structure and Credit Rating 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) showed with their propositions (I and II) how the market value 
of any firm is independent of its capital structure. This holds in perfect capital markets 
because of the law of one price and the fact that investors can replicate any firm’s capital 
structure by borrowing or lending to his or her own portfolio and thus produce cash flows 
identical to unlevered equity. Hence the management’s choice of capital structure is 
irrelevant for the firm value, as investors could easily alter the leverage choice of the firm 
themselves. The assumption of perfect capital markets is of course unrealistic, but it serves 
as a basis for explaining why and when capital structure does in fact matter. Capital structure 
matters due to market imperfection, like taxes, financial distress and agency costs/benefits of 
debt. The interest tax shield provides an incentive to add debt to the capital structure in order 
to reduce tax payments. However, firms do not add unlimited amounts of debt to their capital 
structure, and the difference between net debt-to-enterprise values varies greatly in and 
between industries. Balancing the advantages and disadvantages of debt is formally referred 
to as the trade-off theory. By acknowledging that capital structure is relevant for the 
valuation of the firm, it becomes interesting to examine whether the stock price effect of a 
credit rating announcement is related to the firm’s capital structure, i.e. the level of leverage.   
Kliger and Sarig (2000) find that the effect of rating information on bond prices is 
monotonic in firm leverage, i.e. the more leveraged the firm has, the stronger the reaction to 
new rating information. The fact that firms near a credit rating upgrade or downgrade issue 
less debt relative to equity than firms not near a change in rating underpins the important 
inverse relationship between leverage and credit rating (Kisgen, 2006). It is tempting to 
expect that leveraged firms face more financial problems when they are downgraded than 
less leveraged firms due to the relative increase in interest expenses. However, it does not 
always need to be the case as the firm might have a large and stable cash flow. Moreover, a 
change in credit rating affects the marginal cost of debt and usually not the interest on 
already outstanding debt. Another relevant aspect which complicates the research is that 
firms have different sources of financing, i.e. the bond market and bank financing. The 
Scandinavian bond market is underdeveloped compared to the US or UK. There are also 
differences between the Scandinavian countries and the Danish bond market is, for example, 
much more developed than the Norwegian. The terms on which firms can fund themself 
through banks is not neccessarily affected in the same way as the the cost of issuing new 
bonds, which distortes the association between credit rating changes and stock returns.   
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It is a common view in corporate finance that firms are underleveraged given the potential 
large tax benefits of debt (Molina, 2005). Molina (2005) argues that this capital structure 
puzzle could be partially explained by misspecifications in previous research. He claimes 
that previous estimates on the financial distress costs (indirect costs of bankruptcy) of 
leverage are biased downward because they fail to recognize an endogeneity problem in the 
estimation of credit rating as a function of leverage. More specifically, the endogeneity 
occurs because leverage and ratings are jointly determined. By using and instrumental 
approach, he shows that the true ex ante cost of financial distress is in fact up to three times 
larger than previously suggested. The significant impact of leverage on financial distress 
costs implies that firms may not be as underleveraged as previously suggested. Moreover, it 
translates into a strong relationship between an increase in debt and a rating downgrade due 
to the increase in default probabilities.  
Graham and Harvey (2001) find that credit ratings are the second most important concern to 
CFOs when determining the capital structure. This is consistent with the view that leverage 
and ratings are jointly determined. They report that credit rating is considered more 
important than many factors suggested by traditional capital structure theories, such as the 
tax advantage of debt. The most important debt policy factor, however, is financial 
flexibility. If the market perceives that a firm does not hold an optimal capital structure, 
increasing the level of debt could make the stock price go up, even though increased levels 
of debt results in a credit rating downgrade. Hence, there is a trade-off between the cost of 
capital, shareholder value and credit rating. Two examples of this is refered to in a 
publication by Zanders Treasury & Finance Solutions (Tijdhof). In one case, Nestlé decided 
not to reduce its leverage, even though they explicitly announced that a reduction in leverage 
would reduce its WACC. The main reason for this was that they wanted to maintain 
maximum financial flexibility for potential acquisitions. In another case, KPN Telecom 
increased its leverage despite warnings from the CRAs of a possible downgrade. They did 
this due to a potential hostile takeover by a group of private equity firms, which felt KPN 
Telecom was too conservatively leveraged. The additional debt was used to repurchase 
shares and for future acquisitions. Consequently, the firms was downgraded. The 
stockmarket, however, rewarded the stock by sending it up by 6.4 percent.    
The Modigliani and Miller world assumes perfect capital markets. These examples illustrate 
the complexity of capital structure desicion making and that the finance markets do not 
always act according to theory. Firms might take on more debt even though it results in a 
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downgrade because they perceive that it is beneficial for some other reason than credit 
rating. This distorts the relationship between capital structure and credit rating. However, in 
general, managers find that credit ratings directly affect capital structure decisions (Graham 
& Harvey, 2001) and vice versa (Molina (2005), Kisgen (2006)). Hence, it seems likely that, 
unless there are compelling reasons to do otherwise, firms will adhere to maintain or 
improve its credit rating. As leverage is one of the most important determinants for credit 
rating, both intuition and previous research (Kliger & Sarig, 2000 ), suggest that highly 
leveraged firms experience a more significant stock price reaction to credit rating 
downgrades than do less leveraged firms. On that insight I arrive at my third hypothesis: 
           : Highly leveraged firms experience more significant stock price 
reactions to credit rating announcements than do less leveraged firms. 
Many institutional investors (e.g. pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies and 
brokers) are restricted or prohibited from purchase of bonds with a low credit rating. This 
implies discrete costs/benefits associated with a change in credit rating and similarly a 
discontinuous relationship between leverage and the firm value.  Consequently, one would 
expect that changes in credit rating that leads to a reclassification, from investment grade to 
non-investment grade or vice versa, would have the most profound effect on the company’s 
stock price. Kisgen (2006) finds that managers are concerned with rating-triggered costs and 
the effects of regulations of bond investors. Specifically, managers are concerned about 
credit rating levels that affect the access to commercial papers and bond liquidity issues most 
severely. He also shows that a change from investment grade to non-investment grade is 
incrementally significant. Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992) find that below 
investment grade firms experiense more negative excess stock returns associated with rating 
downgrade announcements compared to investment grade firms. The same applies to rating 
upgrades (positive excess returns) however, the results are not significant. I would like to test 
whether it is a significantly larger stock price reaction when firms are downgraded from 
investment grade to non-investment grade, or vice versa, compared to downgrades that do 
not result in such a reclassification. It seems likely that there is a significant difference, 
according to the aforementioned research and discussion.  
           : Credit ratings that result in a reclassification from investment grade to non-
investment grade, or vice versa, have a greater effect on stock prices than credit rating 
announcements that do not invoke such a reclassification. 
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As a natural extension of this hypothesis, I will also assess whether there are scale effects. 
That is, whether firms with low credit rating experience a more significant stock price 
reaction associated with credit rating announcements than firms with higher credit rating. 
           : Changes in credit rating have a more significant effect on stock prices 
for firms with low a credit rating, compared to firms with a high credit rating. 
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4. Methodology and Data Sample  
4.1 Event Study 
An event study examines the effect of some (unanticipated) event, X, on a dependent 
variable, Y. Y is often the value of an asset, e.g. stock prices (returns), exchange rates, 
volatility or bond prices. Examples of X are earnings announcements, stock splits, mergers 
or takeover announcements, or a regular change (Benninga, 2008). In this thesis, Y is the 
(log) stock return of the issuing company, and X is a change in credit rating. Event studies 
are widely used in corporate finance and other areas like accounting, industrial organization 
and macroeconomics, and the literature is extensive. Event studies serve an important 
purpose in corporate finance research and the cleanest evidence on market-efficiency comes 
from event studies (Fama, 1991). 
The time-line of an event study can be illustrated as followe: 
 
Source: (Benninga, 2008) 
I have defined the estimation window (control period) to be 252 trading days prior to the 
event date, and the return frequency is daily. Daily data is favourable because it allows 
precise measurement of the stock-price’s reaction to credit rating announcements, the central 
issue for testing market efficiency (Fama, 1991). It is a trade-off between improved 
estimation accuracy and relevance (potential parameter shifts) in choosing the estimation 
window. It is necessary with some length on the estimation window (number of 
observations) in order to capture the “normal” stock price behaviour prior to the 
announcement and the expected return of the stock. On the other hand, using a too wide 
estimation window increases the probability of including non-representative data, i.e. old 
data that is obsolete (Benninga, 2008). 252 days is often used in event studies however, the 
choice is arbitrary and other estimation periods could be just as good. I have chosen three 
different event windows in addition to abnormal return on the event day,   .  
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I defined the following event windows:         ,          and         . The event window 
         consists of five trading days plus the event day and has been chosen because I 
assume it captures most of the pre-announcement effect. Previous studies (Holthausen and 
Leftwich (1986), Goh and Ederington (1993)) observe significant returns prior to 
announcements, indicating some anticipation. This is often used as evidence of information 
leakage by insiders. In this study, such a stock price pattern would indicate that the CRAs, 
the company itself or someone else with inside information reveals this to the market prior 
the credit rating announcement.  
The event window          is chosen for two reasons. I assume that the closer one is to the 
announcement day, i.e. the day the decision is made to upgrade/downgrade a firm, the more 
likely it is that inside information is leaked to the market and utilized. Furthermore, the post 
event day (  ) takes into account that the announcement may be released after the stock 
exchange has closed and/or that the stock is not traded on the day   . A wide window is 
more likely to capture the entire effect of the credit rating announcement. On the other hand, 
a narrow event window minimizes the likelihood that the announcement effect is 
contaminated with other “noisy” news (Holthausen & Leftwich, 1986 ). Event studies on 
daily data typically show that stock prices, on average, seem to adjust within a day to the 
event announcement (Fama, 1991). Consequently, I expect this event window, in addition to 
   itself, to be the most significant window.   
The post-event windows are normally used to investigate the long term effect of the event, 
which is not a subject of this thesis. Moreover, long-horizon event studies suffer from 
serious limitations, thus making it difficult to draw inference. They are, for example, often 
poorly specified and have limited power to detect abnormal performance. In contrast, short-
horizon methods are much more reliable and are less sensitive to assumptions about the 
return generating process (Eckbo, 2007). Consequently, I have constructed a narrow post-
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event window,         . It is meant to capture that all investors might not rebalance their 
portfolios on the announcement day. For example, some large institutional investors may 
avoid selling all their stocks immediately in order not to affect the stock price unnecessarily. 
Thus, I allow for some days succeeding the announcement day, so investors can adjust to the 
new information.  The lengths of the event windows are arbitrary, and I recognize that other 
lengths could be just as reasonable. 
4.2 Data Overview and Processing 
The data sample consists of 23 different Scandinavian public companies rated by Standard 
and Poor’s during a ten year period from 2001–2011 (Table 1a). Thirteen industries are 
represented in the sample. The majority of observations are in the following industries: 
telecom services (17%), capital goods (12%), energy (12%), paper & forest products (12%) 
and information technology (11%) (Table 1b). No single industry seems to dominate the 
sample, which could have been a potential source of bias. The frequency of upgrades and 
downgrades are unevenly distributed across time (Figure.1a and b). The table does not 
provide any clear picture and the imbalance is probably due to the time period chosen.  
There are a total of 93 observations i.e. changes in issuer credit rating, from which 64 are 
downgrades, 29 are upgrades, and two are defaults (Table 2). Descriptive statistics for the 
sample are provided in Table 3.The initial sample was about twice that size, but many 
observations were deleted either because there was no change in rating (initial rating or 
reconfirmation of rating) or the firm was delisted and stock price data was unavailable. The 
limited number of observations is a weakness of the study because the results become more 
influenced by large positive or negative observations, which may not be representative for 
the true population. 
4.2.1 Methodological Issues 
In order to draw inference, the sample has to be representative for the population. There are 
different sampling methods used in empirical research. Random sampling is necessary to 
avoid bias in the sample selection. It is also one of the criteria for satisfying parametric 
statistical test. The only way to fully avoid the possible bias in sampling is to have data of 
the entire population. In most cases, that is neither possible nor feasible. My sample from 
S&P comprises the majority of Scandinavian corporations that have an issuer credit rating. If 
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the firms rated by S&P share some underlying characteristics that are not shared by firms 
rated by other CRAs, it would introduce selection bias to the sample. It has, however, not 
come to my attention that such a bias exists. Most companies have ratings issued by more 
than just one CRA. Hence, the sample from S&P is likely to represent most firms that are 
being rated.  
A more serious concern in the empirical research is non-sampling errors. Non-sampling 
errors are due to mistakes made in the acquisition of data or in the processing of the data. I 
gathered information on stock prices from Thomson Datastream, Macrobond and Yahoo! 
Finance. The frequency of the data is daily, and I used the adjusted closing price, which has 
been amended to include any corporate actions such as stock splits, dividends and rights 
offerings. Balance sheets were gathered from the two former ones or directly from the 
company’s homepage. Non-sampling errors could have occurred during this process and 
consequently affected the results.  
Non-response errors are another potential pitfall in the research. Non-response errors arise 
when observations are not obtained for some of the firms in the sample. Firstly, the variables 
for leverage (see section 4.2.3) are based on interim reports. I was not able to obtain interim 
balance sheets for some of the observations, in which case I used the latest annual report. 
Secondly, I did not manage to gather information on the variable for CreditWatch (see 
section 4.2.4 A) for all observations. The consequence of this is a reduction in the response 
rate which decreases the validity of the research. 
4.2.2 Confounding Effects 
Calculations of abnormal returns can be distorted if the rating agency announcement is 
accompanied by a concurrent disclosure. Concurrent disclosures will act as “noise” in the 
calculation of excess returns, making it difficult to isolate the partial effect of the rating 
announcement. Early research on the stock price effect of rating announcements did not 
control for confounding events, although the problem was recognized (Holthausen & 
Leftwich, 1986 ). Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) identify possible “noisy information” by 
examining all the stories in the Wall Street Journal Index for potential new stories in the 
event window. If the stories contained any other information than the rating agency 
announcement, the observation was classified as contaminated and deleted from the sample. 
Goh and Ederington (1993) also searched the Wall Street Journal Index for other firm-
specific information releases in the event window. By adjusting for this “noise”, they found 
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that the negative cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of downgrades became less negative, 
and the negative pre-announcement CARs became insignificant.  
A manual inspection of all news regarding the issuing company might seem favourable. 
However, such an inspection would be very comprehensive and almost impossible to 
implement. Firstly, most large public companies are covered by the media every single day, 
and the vast stream of news today is incomparable to those 20 to 30 years ago. Secondly, it 
would introduce possible biases in the research, namely with respect to which news to regard 
as “noise” and which are not. Instead, I apply a statistical approach to reduce the effect of 
observations which appear to be inconsistent with the rest of the data set. These extreme 
observations are often called outliers and could be caused by other information than the 
credit rating announcement itself. Outliers could in most cases be detected visually in a 
scatter plot or by inspecting a frequency chart. The effect of including an outlier is that the 
average for the sample becomes unrepresentative, the standard deviation
1
 increases and the 
power of statistical tests goes down (Foster, 1986). Almost all quantitative studies are based 
on normality or models that assume a normal distribution. Hence, adjusting for outliers 
makes the data better satisfy the basic assumptions necessary to run most statistical test. 
Other types of news (“noise”) could be correlated with both the dependent and independent 
variable and therefore need to be accounted for. This is also referred to as omitted variable 
bias
2
. Failing to control for noise could give rise to type I errors, i.e. reject the null 
hypothesis when it is in fact true (Wooldridge, 2008). Such spurious regression is a threat to 
internal validity and may result in erroneous conclusions about the effect of credit rating 
changes on stock returns.   
I decided to take an operationally active approach towards outliers. Two widely used 
methods are trimming and winsorizing the sample. The former entails sorting the 
observations in ascending order and removing a given percentile of the extreme observations 
in both ends. The drawback with this method is that you lose observations. Hence, this 
method is not favourable as the sample size is rather limited. In the latter method, the data is 
also sorted in ascending order, and all outliers are set equal to a specified percentile of the 
                                                 
1 Std.dev = σ =     
2 Omitted variable bias can be summarized mathematically by a formula for this bias:        +     
  
  
, where the 
correlation between    and    is corr(  ,   ) =     . Then, as the sample size increases,     is close to    +     
  
  
 with 
increasing probability (Stock & Watson, 2007) 
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data. I decided to use a 90% winsorizing, in that all data above the 95
th
 percentile is set to the 
95
th
 percentile, and all data below the 5
th
 percentile is set to the 5
th
 percentile. The cut off 
point is, however, arbitrary. This method avoids losing observations. On the other hand, the 
substituted numbers are really not observed observations but constructed ones. I experienced 
that the mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis
3
 improved for all event windows 
(Table 4). The most significant results apply to credit rating downgrades. The change in the 
mean value for downgrades is much more significant than for upgrades, indicating that the 
initial sample was highly influenced by large negative stock returns. 
4.2.3 Capital Structure 
Having observations that vary in size introduces biases in all parametric tests, and hence, it is 
feasible to work with ratios. The theory of how capital structure may affect stock returns is 
operationalized through the dummy variables Lev1 and Lev2. These two variables are 
defined as:  
Lev1 = Net Debt / Total Assets 
Lev2 = Current Assets / Current Liabilities 
Lev1 is a proxy for solvency. Issuer credit ratings express forward looking opinions 
regarding the creditworthiness of issuers and affect the terms on which firms are able to 
refinance their debt in the future. Consequently, I expect a measure of solvency to be the 
most important variable in explaining the hypothesised larger impact of credit rating 
announcements for highly leveraged firms. Lev2 is a proxy for liquidity and is presumably 
less significant. However, as debt is about to become due, it is classified as a current liability 
and firms with significant long term debt will tend to have a great deal of short term debt. It 
captures in essence much of the same as Lev1, but it also recognizes that firms with much 
current assets not reflected in net debt, e.g. accounts receivable, increases the firm’s ability 
to repay interests in a timely manner. In addition, it disentangles firms that are financed with 
much short-term debt from those which are financed with more long-term debt. 
Investors use accounting information in order to assess Lev1 and Lev2. Hence, I have used 
the latest quarter report for all observations. If a change in credit rating occurs in April, for 
                                                 
3 Skewness =  
         
  
  
  Kurtosis = 
         
  
  
  
 25 
example, it is crucial to use the latest quarterly report (Q1). Using the Q2 report would 
invoke hindsight bias. It means that investors need to have access to the information (on 
Lev1 and Lev2) at the time that the credit rating occurs (  ). Using information that is not yet 
available to investors would obviously be erroneous.  
Not all companies release their information to stakeholders simultaneously. Non-
synchronous accounting periods make it difficult to use standardised dates for releases of 
accounting information to the stock exchange. I did, however, with lack of other 
information, assume that Q1 reports were released on April 1
st
, Q2 on July 1
st 
etc. One 
potential problem with cross-sectional and time-series analysis is that structural changes may 
occur over the sample period or event window due to e.g. mergers, acquisitions or 
divestures. Another possible problem is changes in accounting methods (e.g., mandatory 
adoption of IFRS) and other firms may have changed their individual reporting format. 
Quarterly information could be subject to seasonal components and unadjusted information. 
For example, many firms have seasonal variations in sales, which affect accounts receivable, 
accounts payable, cash, inventory etc. This would make Lev2 cyclical as well. Furthermore, 
about 70% of impairments are made in the last quarter, and hence affect Lev1 (Foster, 1986). 
All these possible pitfalls are assumed not to be significant. However, it would be feasible to 
try to correct for these factors in more comprehensive research.  
4.2.4 Dummy Variables 
A. Market Anticipation 
Hsueh and Liu (1992) suggest that the conflicting empirical results in previous studies are 
due to failure to controll for anticipation, and ignoring market anticipation will bias the 
results. Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) suggest that an expectations model of rating 
changes could provide more powerful tests of the effect of rating change announcements by 
concentrating on those which are least expected. I try to operationalize expectations in the 
market by taking account for warnings of possible rating changes via additions to the S&P 
CreditWatch List. I do a separate examination of credit rating upgrades preceded by positive 
outlooks and neutral or negative outlooks. My expectation is that upgrades preceded by 
positive outlooks are more anticipated in the market than upgrades preceded by neutral or 
negative outlooks. I do a similar examination of downgrades, and the dummy variable is 
denoted Watch. 
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One problem with this approach was access to information of additions to CreditWatch List. 
From a total of 93 observations I found that 11 observations were not obtainable, and only 
13 of the observations were assigned to the category neutral or developing. Only twice did 
the credit rating occur in the opposite direction as indicated by the review. Historically have 
66%-76% of all ratings have been changed in the same direction as indicated by the review 
and rarely in the opposite direction (Moody`s Investors Service, 2002).  
B. Rating Re-classification 
Hypothesis five suggests that a change from investment grade to non-investment grade, or 
vice versa, is incrementally significant. There are ten observations that involve a 
reclassification, from which three are upgrades from non-investment grade to investments 
grade, and seven observations are downgrades from investment grade to non-investment 
grade. The dummy variable for re-classification is denoted Reclass.  
C. Rating Category 
I have pooled the sample based on credit rating into rating categories (Table 5). This has 
been done to facilitate the fact that the default rate is non-linear in rating category, i.e. the 
default rate over consecutive years rises more steeply for low levels of credit rating than high 
levels of credit rating (Moody`s Investors Service, 2002). Hence, it makes sense to evaluate 
credit rating announcements conditional on the given rating class, as suggested in hypothesis 
five. The categories follow industry analogy and are used by, among others, Morgan Stanley. 
For example, A+, A and A- have been pooled together into the rating category upper 
medium grade, BBB+, BBB and BBB- have been pooled together into the rating category 
lower medium grade etc. The categories are donated Grade and are used later in the analysis. 
I also discriminate firms based on whether they are classified as investment grade or not. The 
dummy is named Invest.grade and takes on the value 0 for investment grade firms and 1 for 
non-investment grade firms. I expect the coefficient on this variable to be positive for 
upgrades and negative for downgrades, as a change in credit rating presumably has greater 
effect for firms which already have a low credit rating.  
The majority of upgrades are in the rating class lower medium grade (53%), while the 
majority of downgrades are in the lower medium grade (40%) and speculative grade (23%). 
The picture is that upgrades seem to tilt towards the upper range of the rating scale, while 
downgrades seem to tilt towards the lower range of the rating scale (Table 6).  This comes as 
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no surprise and is probably due to rating transition, i.e. emission risk. Issuers that came to 
have a certain rating are not equally likely to observe a rating in the opposite direction of the 
previous change in credit rating. In other words, an upgrade is more likely to be followed by 
an upgrade than a downgrade and vice versa (Moody`s Investors Service, 2002). This is also 
referred to as rating momentum. Consequently, by including a dummy for rating class I 
allow for a conditional treatment of ratings and emission risk.  
4.3 Calculating Abnormal Returns 
An event study seeks to establish whether the cross-sectional distribution of returns at time 
zero is abnormal, that is, systematically different from expected (Eckbo, 2007). Abnormal 
return (AR) for an individual stock is calculated as the difference between the actual return of 
firm i on time t,     , and the expected return of the stock,        .   
      =      -         
      ~ N(0,     
 ) 
In the event study literature, the focus almost always is on the mean of the distribution of 
abnormal returns i.e. the first moment of the return distribution. Exact statistics depends on 
      being independent and identically distributed across time (i.i.d). According to Eckbo 
(2007), cross-correlation in abnormal returns is almost irrelevant in short-window event 
studies. Under the null hypothesis,       is normally distributed with zero mean and unit 
variance
4
.  
In a sample of N stocks, the cross-sectional average abnormal return (AAR) at time t is: 
        = 
 
 
     
 
    
The variance is defined as: 
var(       ) = 
 
 
     
  
    
The expected return is given by a particular model and the abnormal return is a direct 
measure of the unanticipated change in the stockholders wealth associated with a credit 
rating announcement. The expected return model serves as a proxy for the “normal” return 
                                                 
4 The variance of a discrete random variable Y, donated   
  , is   
  = var(Y) = E           
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of stock i, and must be specified in order to calculate excess returns. Each method has its 
advantages and disadvantages, and both the bias and precision of the expected return 
measure can differ, affecting the properties of abnormal return measures (Eckbo, 2007). 
There are, in general, two approaches for measuring expected returns, that is, statistical 
models and economic models (MacKinely, 1997). The former ones follow statistical 
assumptions about the behaviour of stock returns and do not depend on any economic 
theory. The latter ones are based on assumptions regarding investor’s behaviour and are not 
based solely on statistical assumptions. The potential advantage of economic models is not 
the absence of statistical assumptions, but the opportunity to calculate more precise measures 
of expected return using economic restrictions (MacKinely, 1997).  
4.3.1 Expected Return Models 
A. Mean Adjusted Return 
The constant mean return model is a statistical model. It is the simplest model and requires 
no underlying theory of asset prices (MacKinely, 1997). The model can be expressed as: 
        =       +        
E(    ) = 0, var(    ) =  
  
where      is the period t  return of asset i, and      is an error term with zero mean and unit 
variance.      is assumed to be normally distributed and i.i.d. Despite the model’s simple 
design, it often yields results similar to those of more sophisticated models (MacKinely, 
1997). However, the method would produce upwardly or downwardly biased abnormal 
returns in bull and bear markets, respectively.   
B. Market Adjusted Return 
The market adjusted return is the return of the market (    ) in the event window. The 
model assumes that all stocks, on average, generate the same rate of return. Thus, the 
differences in return between stock i and the market represent excess or abnormal return. 
        =      +            
E(    ) = 0, var(    ) =  
  
The model can be viewed as a restricted market model (see below) with    equal to zero and 
   constrained to one. Because the model parameters are prespecified, it requires no 
estimation period. It does, however, require a choice of which benchmark to use. The 
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benchmark is a proxy for the market portfolio which includes all traded assets. No index 
fully satisfies this criterion, but a broad-based, value-weighted index or a float weighted 
index like the S&P500 or MSCI World Index is often used (Benninga, 2008). I have 
deviated a bit from theory in my choice of benchmark. I believe it is favourable to use 
national indexes because the samples of stocks are more likely to be correlated with their 
national stock market than with e.g. S&P500. Hence, I use the OSEBX for the Norwegian 
stocks, OMXS30 for Swedish stocks and OMXC20 for Danish stocks. Stockholm Stock 
Exchange and Copenhagen Stock Exchange have been acquired by OMX, which is now part 
of the NASDAQ OMX Group.  
C. The Market Model  
The market model is the most common model for estimating the stock’s behaviour under 
“normal” circumstances (MacKinely, 1997). It is a statistical approach, and theory does not 
impose any constraints on the model. The market model for stock i is computed based on a 
single factor market model and can be expressed as 
     =            +           
 E(    ) = 0, var(    ) =  
   
     and      are the period t return of stock i  and the market respectively. In this model, as 
for the market adjusted return model, OSEBX, OMXC20 and OMXS30 serve as proxies for 
the market return in the respective countries. The coefficients,     and    , are estimated 
running an ordinary least-square (OLS)
5
 regression over the estimation period and the 
expected return is: 
        =               
By substituting         in the formula for AR we get the following expression:  
      =      – (            ) 
The    is a measure of how well the OLS regression fits the data6. 
                                                 
5 The OLS estimator chooses     and     to minimize:    
  
    =                
  
    
where    =    -     =              and    =    +      +    
6 The regression    is the fraction of the sample variance of    explained by the regressors:  
  = 
   
   
 = 1- 
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D. CAPM Adjusted Return 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model, CAPM, was originally developed by Sharpe (1964), 
Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966).  The CAPM generalize the relationship between expected 
returns on assets and their exposure to market risk. It states that an asset is expected to earn 
the risk-free rate plus a premium for bearing risk, measures by the asset’s beta (Bodie, Kane, 
& Marcus, 2008). It is formally expressed as: 
E(  ) =    +        ) -   ) 
   is the risk free rate and        -   ) is the expected  market risk premium, and the beta, 
  7 measures the co-movement between the stock i  and the market. This model, in contrast 
to the market model, imposes constraints on the constant term. Despite its appealing 
construction, the CAPM has received considerable criticism due to its underlying 
assumptions (e.g. about investor’s behaviour and only one common risk factor). Because the 
validity of the restrictions imposed by the model is highly questionable, the use of CAPM 
has almost ceased in event studies (MacKinely, 1997). 
E. Multifactor Models 
A one-factor model assumes that the return on the stock is driven solely by the market index. 
A multi-factor model appreciates that there could be other factors, which helps explain the 
return of the stock. Fama and French have done extensive research on alternative factors, 
besides market risks, for explaining the realized return of stocks. They found “value” and 
“size” to be the most important factors. To address these risks, they constructed two factors: 
SMB (small minus big market capitalization) to address size and HML (high minus low 
book-to-market ratio) to address value (Womack & Zhang, 2003). Analogous to the CAPM, 
this model describes the expected return of stock i as a result of three risk factors: 
   =    +       -   ) +       +       
                                                                                                                                                       
where the explained sum of squares is, ESS =           
  
    and the total sum of squares is, TSS =          
  
    
7    = 
          
       
 and cov(X,Y) =    = E               
 31 
Other multifactor models include industry returns (matched firm approach), to account for 
industry-specific information in addition to the market-specific information (Benninga, 
2008): 
     =                       +                        
The method is very similar to the reference portfolio method.  
F. Reference Portfolios 
In this model, the expected return is assumed equal to the return on a reference portfolio. The 
reference portfolio should comprise companies with similar characteristics as stock i, usually 
based on the criteria of size and the book-to-market ratio (B/M). Researchers often rank 
firms into deciles portfolios based on size and/or the B/M ratio. The average return of the 
portfolio is used as a proxy for the expected return. This approach, and the industry average 
method is often used on US data, e.g. by Kliger and Sarig (2000). This method is, in my 
opinion, less feasible on the Scandinavian stock market, due to the limited number of public 
companies and the lack of peer group companies.  
Generally, the gain from employing multifactor models for event studies is limited. This is 
because of the marginal explanatory power of additional factors and little reduction in the 
variance of abnormal returns (MacKinely, 1997).  
Short horizon models, like in this thesis, are generally not very sensitive to the choice of 
return model, nor are they with respect to cross-sectional or time-series dependence of 
abnormal returns (Eckbo, 2007). Choosing a model of expected returns poses a significant 
challenge because event study tests are joint tests. However, one advantage of using daily 
data is that one can circumvent the joint-hypothesis problem that market efficiency must be 
tested jointly with an asset pricing model (Fama, 1991). Consequently, the way one 
estimates expected returns in calculating abnormal returns may have little effect on 
inference. By acknowledging this, I decided to calculate abnormal returns relative to two 
commonly used return models: (i) the market adjusted return model and (ii) the market 
model. The latter one is estimated by running an OLS regression of stock i on the benchmark 
over the estimation period. The former one simply assumes    equal to zero and    
constrained to one. 
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4.3.2 Aggregation of Abnormal Returns 
The abnormal return observations must be aggregated in order to draw overall inference. The 
aggregation is across two dimensions: a cross sectional dimension, N, and a time-series 
dimension, T. This is referred to as panel data or longitudinal data. The advantages of panel 
data are the ability to increase the sample size, reduce multicollinearity problems
8
, and are 
able to build more dynamic models and enable better control of unobserved effects 
(Wooldridge, 2008). 
A. Time-Series Aggregation 
When estimating returns over multiple days, there are a number of methods for time-series 
aggregation over the event windows (Eckbo, 2007).  One method is to calculate the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in the pre-event window and post-event window. The 
CAR for an individual stock is the abnormal return of the stock over the event window (t, T): 
          =       
 
    
Under the null hypothesis of no abnormal return, the CAR is zero and the test statistics  
    
      
 is Student’s t distributed with N-1 degrees of freedom.  
The buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR)
9
 is another method for time-series aggregation. 
CAR and BHAR measure the return to an investor who follows a simple trading strategy that 
buys/sells the stock at the time of a credit rating announcement (  ) and holds the stock 
through the end of the post-event window         . CAR and BHAR is of interest when 
applied to the post-event window, as these measures provide information about market 
efficiency, in that nonzero abnormal returns following a credit rating announcement are 
inconsistent with efficiency and imply a profitable trading strategy (ignoring trading costs) 
(Eckbo, 2007).  
                                                 
8 Perfect multicollinearity arises when one of the regressors is a perfect linear combination of the other regressors and is a 
violation of the OLS assumptions. Panel data reduces the likelihood of perfect multicollinearity because of variation 
between cross-sections and variation over time (Wooldridge, 2008). 
9              =                        
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B. Cross-Sectional Aggregation 
Cross-sectional tests provide a more complete picture of the effect of credit rating 
announcements. These tests appreciate that the stock price effect is related to firm 
characteristics. This allows us to discriminate among various economic hypotheses (Eckbo, 
2007). The cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) is: 
             =         
 
    
and the variance is defined as:  
var(            ) =             
 
    
For a cross-section of firms, (cumulative) abnormal returns are regressed against firm 
characteristics, e.g. leverage (Lev1 and Lev2), whether or not the firm is reclassified 
(Reclass), is put on CreditWatch list (Watch), in which rating category (Grade) the firm is 
and whether it is classified as investment grade or non-investment grade (Invest.grade).  
4.4 Testing for Significance 
The effect of a credit rating announcement is assessed by a t-test, which utilizes the excess 
increase/decrease in the stock price over the event window, relative to the standard deviation 
of the stock’s return over the estimation window. In the event study literature, the focus 
almost always is on the mean of the distribution of abnormal returns. This allows one to 
establish whether the event is, on average, associated with a change in the stock price and 
predict the sign of the average effect. To test for significance of abnormal returns, I use 
parametric tests of t-statistics
10
.  Finally, I make use of linear (multiple) regression analysis.   
4.4.1 The t-statistics 
The t-statistics is used to test whether the AAR/CAARs are significantly different from zero. 
A t-test is a parametric test, which follows a Student t distribution. The Student t distribution 
has a bell shape similar to that of the normal distribution, but when the number of 
observations is small (N < 20), it has more mass in the tails (excess kurtosis). When N is 30 
or more, the Student t distribution is well approximated by the standard normal distribution.  
                                                 
10 Parametric tests could also be complemented with non-parametric tests, like the sign test and the rank test. 
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Across N firms, the      is the relevant statistics for testing the abnormal return on the event 
day (  ). The       is the appropriate test statistics for the respective event windows. The 
degrees of freedom used in this test are n-1 and the p-value which can be calculated by 
using:  
p-value = 2Φ(-   ) 
I also make use of the two-sample t-test in order to assess whether there are any differences 
between abnormal returns based on certain criteria, e.g. market anticipation, re-classification 
and rating category:  
      
                  
                   
 
       
                        
                         
 
The p-value is calculated exactly as in the case of a single population. If the alternative 
hypothesis is one-sided rather than two sided, the p-value is calculated as: 
p-value =     (Z > t) = 1 - Φ(t) 
 
4.4.2 Regression Analysis 
The t-statistics is useful in that it provides a statistical measure of the AAR/CAAR and the 
sign of the effect. It does, however, not provide any explanation for the observed stock return 
associated with credit ratings. In order to discriminate among the various economic 
hypotheses set forth, I make use of regression analysis. The explanatory variables which I 
expect to be related to abnormal stock returns are: leverage (Lev1 and Lev2), anticipation 
(Watch), reclassification (Reclass), and rating classification (Invest.grade). The simple linear 
regression with one independent variable is: 
   =    +      +   ,   i = 1,...,N 
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where    is abnormal returns,    is the intercept,    is the slope of the regression line,    is 
the independent variable and    is the error term.  Multiple regression analysis is used to 
model the relationship between (cumulative) abnormal returns and independent variables 
which may explain the effect of credit ratings on stock returns. The advantage of multiple 
regressions is that we can estimate the (partial) effect of one regressor while holding constant 
the other variables. In multiple regressions, the F-statistics is used to test joint hypothesis 
about the regression coefficients.  
The multiple regression model with two regressors is: 
   =    +        +        +   ,   i = 1,...,N 
Where subscript i indicates the     of the n observations in the sample.    is abnormal 
returns,    is the intercept,    and    are the coefficients on      and      respectively, and    
is the error term.  
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5. Results 
The t-statistics for credit rating downgrades and upgrades for all event windows are 
summarized in the following table: 
 
5.1 Credit Rating Downgrades 
First I test hypothesis 1: Credit rating downgrades have a negative effect on stock returns. 
  :           ≥ 0 
  :           < 0 
This is a one-sided test with a 5% significance level and the critical value is 1,671. By using 
the market adjusted return model, the AAR/CAAR is negative for all event windows and 
highly significant at all reasonable levels. Hence, I can reject the null hypothesis and claim 
that credit rating downgrades have a negative effect on stock prices. The t-statistics from 
using the market model expected return yields the same results. We can see that the risk-
adjustment has almost no effect on the estimates. This confirms that the choice of expected 
return model has virtually no effect on the results. It does, however, add a certain element of 
robustness to the statistics.  
Table. 7 
Mean (Cumulative) Abnormal Returns for Credit Rating Downgrades and Upgrades 
The cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) and the average abnormal return (AAR) is calculated 
relative to two expected return models: The market model and the market adjusted return model. CAAR 
and AAR is reported for all event windows. T-statistics is given in parentheses below the mean values. 
 
Event Market Model Market adj.Model Market Model Market adj.Model
window Downgrades Downgrades Upgrades Upgrades
AAR(t=0) -1,47 % -1,58 % 0,65 % 0,42 %
(-1,98)** (-2,05)** (2,92)*** (2,27)**
CAAR(t=-1,1) -2,17 % -2,40 % 0,96 % 0,94 %
(-1,76)** (-1,90)** (2,22)** (2,06)**
CAAR(t=-5,0) -2,89 % -2,83 % 0,87 % 0,32 %
(-2,34)** (-2,29)** (1,16) (0,42)
CAAR(t=0,5) -3,23 % -2,34 % 0,40 % 0,39 %
(-2,07)** (-1,97)** (0,94) (0,92)
¹ T-statistics are in parantheses
² * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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5.1.1 Capital Structure 
In order to assess whether highly leveraged firms experience more significant stock price 
reactions to credit rating announcements (hypothesis 3), I ran a regression of CAR/AR on 
Lev1 and Lev2. 
 
 
From the regression on AR, we see that the coefficient    is positive and significant on the 
5% level. The sign on    is as expected, that is, a higher current ratio (CA/CL) is associated 
with positive abnormal returns. Lev2 is a proxy for liquidity and captures that firms that are 
financed with much short-term debt (low current ratio) experience more significant negative 
abnormal returns than less leveraged firms in the case of downloads. The magnitude of the 
coefficients is important in order to determine whether they have economic or practical 
significance. Increasing the current ratio, e.g. from 1 to 2, will hamper the effect of a 
downgrade by 1.30%, measured by abnormal returns. 1.30% of the market value is 
obviously of economic interest. On the other hand, it is questionable how feasible it is to 
increase the current ratio by a factor of two. The positive sign on    is counterintuitive, as a 
higher debt-to-asset (D/A) ratio is associated with negative abnormal returns. However, the 
coefficient is not significant and the regression suggests that only Lev2 is important in 
explaining abnormal returns. Consequently, only variations in short term debt seem to 
explain abnormal returns for firms being downgraded. The    is 0.08, thus the variation in 
Lev1 and Lev2 does not explain much of the variation in AR. 
Table. 8 
Regression of (Cumulative) Abnormal Returns on Lev1 and Lev2 
Lev1 and Lev2 are proxies for net-debt-to-asset (D/A) and the current ratio (CA/CL), respectively. 
             ( ,𝑇) =  0 +  1   1 ,  +  2   2 ,  +   ,      
 
ARi(t=0) = -0.0187 + 0.0048Lev1 , +  0.0130Lev2 ,  +  i,t     R
2  = 0.08, SER = 0.0262 
                                         (-1.02)             (0.19)              (2.11**) 
 
¹ T-statistics are in parentheses   ² *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01  ³SER = Standard Error of the Regression  
⁴Only event windows with significant estimates are reported 
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5.1.2 Reclassification 
Hypothesis 4 suggests that credit ratings that result in a reclassification from investment 
grade to non-investment grade have a greater effect on stock returns than credit 
announcements that do not invoke such a reclassification. I did a separate examination of 
downgrades which resulted in a reclassification (                ) and downgrades which did not 
result in a reclassification (            ). Out of the 64 downgrades, only nine observations 
resulted in a reclassification. A two-sample t-test was used to assess the difference between 
the abnormal returns: 
       
                                
                                 
 
The null hypothesis and the one-sided alternative hypothesis are: 
                                     = 0  
                                     < 0 
Table 9 summarizes the results. 
 
 
The table above shows that the mean difference in abnormal return is more negative for 
firms being reclassified than for firms which are not reclassified. The AAR on the 
announcement day is -0.0351 and almost significant on the 5% level. However, it is more 
interesting to notice the highly significant negative CAAR (-0.0649) in the post-event 
window. This gives support to hypothesis 4, namely that firms for which a downgrade result 
in a reclassification have greater effect on abnormal returns than downgrades which do not 
result in a reclassification.   
Table. 9 
Downgrades resulting in a reclassification vs. No-reclassification 
The table shows the difference in cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) and the average abnormal 
return (AAR) for firms being reclassified from investment grade to non-investment grade vs. firms for which a 
downgrade does not result in a reclassification 
 
df Mean diff. S.E. t-value p-value
AAR (t=0) 62 -0,0351 0,0218 -1,6090 0,0564
CAAR(t=-1.1) 62 -0,0363 0,0284 -1,2764 0,1033
CAAR(t=-5.0) 62 -0,0274 0,0321 -0,8531 0,1984
CAAR(t=0.5) 62 -0,0649 0,0335 -1,9405 0,0284
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5.1.3 Market Anticipation 
Anticipation may be a determinant in explaining abnormal returns. A separate examination 
of credit rating downgrades, contingent on the outlook being negative (            ) or not 
(            ) could give an answer to this question. Unfortunately, it was not possible to analyse 
statistically as only two observations out of 64 were non-negative (one positive and one 
neutral). 
5.1.4 Rating Category 
Hypothesis 5 suggests that changes in credit rating have a more significant effect on stock 
returns for firms with low credit rating compared to firms with high credit rating. First, I 
examined whether there are any differences in abnormal returns for firms classified as 
investment grade (            ) or non-investment grade (            ). I pooled all firms above 
BBB- and all firms below BBB-. Out of 64 observations, 37 were downgrades within the 
investment grade classification, while 27 were within the non-investment grade 
classification.  
A two-sample t-test is used to assess the difference between the two groups: 
       
                            
                             
 
The null hypothesis and the two-sided alternative hypothesis are: 
                                 = 0 
                                  ≠ 0 
The t-test yields the following results for the different event windows: 
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It is evident from the table that the difference in AAR/CAAR is significantly different 
between investment grade firms and non-investment grade firms. The results are highly 
significant for all event windows except the post-event window. The result indicates that 
firms within different rating classes cannot be treated similarly and yields for a conditional 
treatment of ratings and emission risk. 
The regression in Table 11 allows for a finer rating partition by dividing the downgrades into 
groups based on the rating category in which a firm is classified after a change in credit 
rating. I ran the following regression: 
 
 
All the coefficients are negative, as expected (they are all downgrades). Grade7 and Grade8 
are significant on all reasonable levels, while the remaining coefficients are non-significant. 
Grade7 and Grade8 are the lowest rating categories hence it is not surprising that 
downgrades in these rating categories yield significant negative abnormal returns. These 
Table. 10 
Downgrades for Investment grade firms vs. Non-investment grade firms 
The table shows the mean difference in cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) and the average abnormal 
return (AAR) for firms being downgraded within the investment grade classification vs. firms being downgraded 
within the non-investment grade classification. 
 
df Mean diff. S.E. t-value p-value
AAR (t=0) 62 0,0435 0,0147 2,9620 0,0043
CAAR(t=-1.1) 62 0,0470 0,0155 3,0266 0,0055
CAAR(t=-5.0) 62 0,0461 0,0219 2,1027 0,0396
CAAR(t=0.5) 62 0,0420 0,0237 1,7765 0,0807
Table. 11 
Regression of Cumulative Abnormal Returns on Rating Category  
Firms are pooled into rating categories in order to allow for a conditional treatment of rating category and the 
effect of credit rating changes. The categories are named Grade1, Grade2 etc.  
    ( ,𝑇) =  0 +  1𝐺  𝑑 4 ,  +  2𝐺  𝑑 5 ,  +  3𝐺  𝑑 6 ,  +  4𝐺  𝑑 7 ,  +  5𝐺  𝑑 8 ,  +    ,  
CARi( 1,1) = 0.0063 -  0.0053Grade4 ,  - 0.0281Grade5 ,   - 0.0139Grade6 ,   
                                             (0.42)           (-0.30)                  (-1.37)                     (-0.60)        
- 0.1999Grade7 ,   - 0.1199Grade8 ,  +  i,t  
                                                              (-3.83***)               (-4.44***) 
 
R2  = 0.39, SER = 0.0500 
¹ T-statistics are in parentheses   ² *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01    ³SER = Standard Error of the Regression  
⁴ See Table 5 for description of the rating categories.  There were no downgrades in the others categories.  
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categories are, as the names indicate, extremely speculative and with little prospects for 
recovery. Controlling for downgrades of more than one notch did not affect the results.  
I was initially expecting the coefficient on Grade5 (  ) to be significant. This rating 
category comprises firms which have been reclassified from investment grade to non-
investment grade. Moreover, section 5.1.2 found reclassifications to be significant in the 
post-event window and almost significant on the announcement day. A plausible explanation 
for why Grade5 is not significant could be that it does not solely comprise firms that were 
reclassified. It does, for example, also include firms that were downgraded from BB+ to BB 
or from BB to BB-. These changes in credit rating are possibly not as important as the 
change from BBB- to BB+, and thus render Grade5 insignificant. This indicates that the 
categories could be too wide and that more refined categories would yield different results. 
However, this was not feasible due to the limited number of observations in the sample.  
5.2 Credit Rating Upgrades 
I now move on to testing hypothesis 2: Credit rating upgrades have no effect on stockl 
returns. 
  :           = 0 
  :           ≠ 0 
The mean (cumulative) abnormal returns for upgrades are reported in Table 7 (p. 36). The 
significance level of the test is 5% and the critical value for the two-sided test is 2.048. The 
AAR/CAAR is positive for all event windows. By using the market adjusted return model, 
       is 0.0042 and significant on the 5% level. The            ) is 0.0094 and also 
significant on the 5% level. Hence, I can reject the null hypothesis that credit rating upgrades 
have no effect on stock returns. However, I cannot reject the null hypothesis for             
and            that credit rating upgrades have no effect on stock returns in the pre-event 
window or the post-event window. The t-statistics from using the market model expected 
return yields similar results and the effect of credit rating upgrades is not altered by the 
choice expected return model. 
It is evident from Table 7 that credit ratings do indeed convey information to the market. The 
information content of credit ratings, however, seems to be most significant for downgrades. 
Credit rating downgrades yield significant negative abnormal returns at the announcement 
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day and in all the event windows. Credit rating upgrades yield significant positive stock 
returns on the day of the announcement and plus/minus one day        but not in the pre-
event window or post-event window.  
The cumulative abnormal returns for each day are illustrated in the figures below for the 
market model and the market adjusted return model respectively: 
Figure 2 Stock market reactions to rating change announcement 
 
 
It is evident from Figure 2 that there is a substantial stock price reaction on the 
announcement day (  ) and plus/minus one day      , which we know from the t-tests to be 
statistically significant. It is also possible to depict that the cumulative abnormal return is 
more significant for downgrades than for upgrades in both the pre-event window and the 
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port-event window. The market model and the market adjusted return model gives the same 
picture and the choice of expected return model does not seem to alter the results.  
5.2.1 Capital Structure 
In order to assess whether highly leveraged firms experience more significant stock returns 
to credit rating announcements (hypothesis 3), I ran a regression of CAR/AR on Lev1 and 
Lev2. 
 
 
We see that the coefficient    is negative and significant both on the announcement day (5% 
level) and in the event window        (10% level). The sign on    is as expected that is, a 
higher debt-to-asset ratio is associated with less positive abnormal returns. Hence, the 
regression indicates a relationship between abnormal returns and capital structure. The 
magnitude of the coefficients is –0.0234 on the announcement day but has little economic 
significance. For example, a firm with an initial D/A ratio of 0.5 would only experience 
0.234%
11
  higher abnormal returns by reducing the D/A ratio to 0.4. The corresponding 
change in AR is 0,475%
12
 for          .    is not significant and the sign is counterintuitive 
on the announcement day. One would expect    to be positive i.e. that firms with a high 
current ratio experience more significant abnormal returns in the case of upgrades. The 
regression indicates that only Lev1 is important in explaining abnormal returns for upgrades. 
                                                 
11 ΔY =   Δ  → ΔY = 0.0234*0.1 = 0.00234 (0.234%)  
12 ΔY =   Δ  → ΔY = 0.0475*0.1 = 0.0475 (0.475%) 
Table. 12 
Regression of cumulative abnormal returns on Lev1 and Lev2 
Lev1 and Lev2 are proxies for net-debt-to-asset (D/A) and the current ratio (CA/CL), respectively. 
    ( ,𝑇) =  0 +  1   1 ,  +  2   2 ,  +   ,  
ARi(t=0) = 0.0214 -  0.0234Lev1 ,  - 0.0038Lev2 ,  +  i,t     R
2  = 0.16, SER = 0.0095 
                                           (2.67**)     (-2.13**)           (-1.26) 
 
CARi( 1,1) = 0.0272 - 0.0475Lev1 ,  + 0.0036Lev2 ,  +  i,t     R
2  = 0.13, SER = 0.0237 
                                             (1.36)         (-1.73*)             (0.47) 
¹ T-statistics are in parentheses   ² *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 ³SER = Standard Error of the Regression 
⁴Only event windows with significant estimates are reported 
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This is an interesting result, as it is opposite from credit rating downgrades. Evidently, 
liquidity (Lev2) has more explanatory power than solvency (Lev1) for downgrades, while the 
opposite seems to be true for upgrades. The    is 0.16 for       and 0.13 for          . 
Thus, the explanatory power of the regression is low. 
5.2.2 Reclassification 
Out of the 29 firms that were upgraded, only three experienced a reclassification from non-
investment grade to investment grade. Hence, the sample is too small for an analysis on 
reclassification to make sense.  
5.2.3 Market Anticipation 
As suggested earlier, anticipation may be a determinant in explaining abnormal returns. I did 
a separate examination of credit rating upgrades, contingent on the outlook being positive 
(            ) or not (            ). Out of the 29 upgrades, 15 observations were preceded by 
positive outlooks, 13 neutral outlooks and only one of the upgrade was preceded by a 
negative outlook. A two-sample t-test is used to assess the difference between the two 
groups: 
       
                            
                             
 
The null hypothesis and the two-sided alternative hypothesis are: 
                                 = 0   
                                 ≠ 0 
The t-test did not yield any significant results for any of the event windows. Hence, I cannot 
say that there is any difference between upgrades preceded by positive outlooks and 
upgrades preceded by neutral or negative outlooks. One explanation for this could be that 
addition to S&P CreditWatch simply is not a suitable proxy for market anticipation. For 
example, the effect of being put on watch list could already be reflected in the stock price at 
the time of the credit rating announcement. Furthermore, one must take into account the 
availability of other sources of information in the market prior to the rating announcement 
which may render the dummy Watch useless. A more comprehensive study might want to 
disentangle the effect of Watch for different firms and time-periods. As shown by Hsueh and 
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Liu (1992), the effect of a rating change is more pronounced during periods of high market 
uncertainty and the information content of credit ratings is more significant for firms in 
which information is relatively limited. 
5.2.4 Rating Category 
First, I examined whether there was any difference in abnormal returns for firms classified as 
investment grade or non-investment grade. I pooled all firms above BBB- and all firms 
below BBB-. A two sample t-test for the difference in abnormal returns did not yield any 
significant results for any of the event windows.   
Secondly, I assessed whether changes in credit rating have a more significant effect on stock 
returns for firms with low credit rating, compared to firms with high credit rating (hypothesis 
5). I ran the following regression: 
 
 
All the coefficients are positive, as expected (they are all upgrades).    is significant on the 
10% level, the remaining coefficients are not significant.    is the coefficient on Grade4, 
which is the lowest rating category within the investment grade classification. It sounds 
reasonable that this is where we are most likely to find significant results. It indicates that 
upgrades have a more significant effect on firms with low credit rating, compared to firms 
with high credit rating, thus giving some support to hypotheses 5. Moreover, the rating 
category Grade4 also entails firms that have been reclassified from non-investment grade to 
investment grade, indicating that reclassification could have an effect on abnormal returns.   
Table. 13 
Regression of Cumulative Abnormal Returns on Rating Category 
Firms are pooled into rating categories in order to allow for a conditional treatment of rating category and the 
effect of credit rating changes. The pooling across rating notches was done to increase the number of 
observations in each rating class.  
    ( ,𝑇) =  0 +  1𝐺  𝑑 2 ,  +  2𝐺  𝑑 3 ,  +  3𝐺  𝑑 4 ,  +  4𝐺  𝑑 5 ,  +   ,  
CARi( 1,1) = - 0.0284 + 0.0179𝐺  𝑑 2 .  + 0.0350𝐺  𝑑 3 ,   + 0.0451𝐺  𝑑 4 ,   
                                                (-1.18)               (0.52)                    (1.36)                   (1.81*)          
+ 0.0315𝐺  𝑑 5 ,  +   ,  
                                                                               (1.19) 
 
R2  = 0.17, SER = 0.0241 
¹ T-statistics are in parentheses   ² *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01   ³SER = Standard Error of the Regression   
⁴ See Table 5 for description of the rating categories.  There were no downgrades in the others categories. 
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5.3 Regression Analysis 
Simple linear regressions give answers to whether the explanatory variables each have an 
individual effect on abnormal returns. However, simple regressions could produce 
misleading results, in that they do not recognize other potential important determinants of 
abnormal returns. Leaving out other potentially important variables could make the OLS 
estimator biased. This is referred to as omitted variable bias. Omitted variable bias occurs 
when (i) the omitted variable is correlated with the included regressor, and (ii) the omitted 
variable is a determinant of the dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2008). For example, Grade 
may very likely be correlated with Lev, and Grade is also a possible determinant of abnormal 
returns. Consequently, the OLS estimator from running a simple regression would be biased. 
Multiple regression analysis is used to model the relationship between (cumulative) 
abnormal returns and different independent variables. The advantage of multiple regressions 
is that we can estimate the (partial) effect of one variable while holding constant the other 
variables. In multiple regressions, the F-statistics is used to test joint hypothesis about the 
regression coefficients.  
Based on the aforementioned hypotheses, I formulate the following multiple regression 
model: 
(1)             =    +           +           +               
+             +             𝑑     +      
Here            is the sample cumulative abnormal return from period t to T. Lev1 and Lev2 
are proxies for capital structure and    and    are the important parameters in assessing 
hypothesis 3. Reclass is a dummy variable which takes on the value 1 for yes and 0 
otherwise. The variable is meant to gauge the impact of being reclassified, either from 
investment grade to non-investments grade or vice versa. Thus    is the important parameter 
for assessing hypothesis 4. Watch is also a dummy variable, which captures (un)anticipation. 
For upgrades, it takes on the value 1 if the event is not anticipated (non-positive outlook) and 
0 otherwise. For downgrades, it is 1 if the event is not anticipated (non-negative outlook), 
and 0 otherwise. Thus the coefficient    tells whether a change in credit rating, not preceded 
by outlook in the same direction, yields abnormal returns.  Invest.grade is a variable that 
indicates level, i.e. what classification the firm gets after a change in credit rating, that is, 
either investment grade or non-investment grade. It allows for a conditional treatment of 
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ratings and emission risk, as suggested by hypothesis 5. It is 0 for investment grade and 1 for 
non-investment grade.  
5.3.1 Credit Rating Downgrades 
The results from running regression (1) on downgrades are reported below: 
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Table. 14 
Results from Ordinary Least Squares Estimation of (Cumulative) Abnormal Returns for 
Credit Rating Downgrades.  
Lev1 and Lev2 are proxies for capital structure. Reclass is meant to gauge the impact of being reclassified, 
either from investment grade to non-investments grade, or vice versa. Watch is a variable which captures 
(un)anticipation and Invest.grade is a variable which indicates level, i.e. what classification the firm gets after a 
change in credit rating. 
    ( ,𝑇) =  0 +  1   1 ,  +  2   2 ,  +  3        ,  
+  4      ,   +  5      .    𝑑  ,  +   ,  
 Market adjusted return model Market model 
    =0     ( 1.1)    =0     ( 1.1) 
 0 -0,0132 
(-0,57) 
 
0,0032 
(0,06) 
-0,0104 
(-0,48) 
-0,0087 
(-0,18) 
 1 -0,0088 
(-0,25) 
 
-0,0292 
(-0,36) 
-0,0039 
(-0,12) 
-0,0142 
(-0,19) 
 2 0,0175 
(2,64)** 
 
0,0109 
(0,72) 
0,0136 
(2,23)** 
0,0132 
(0,97) 
 3 0,0120 
(0,92) 
 
-0,0200 
(-0,66) 
0,0078 
(0,65) 
-0,0138 
(-0,52) 
 4 0,0144 
(0,51) 
 
-0,1290 
(-1,99)** 
0,0391 
(1,51) 
-0,1066 
(-1,84)* 
 5 -0,0212 
(-2,18)** 
 
0,0170 
(0,75) 
-0,0168 
(-1,92)* 
0,0187 
(0,96) 
 2 0,20 0,12 0,17 0,12 
SER 0,0264 0,0611 0,0245 0,1254 
F( 5, 41) 2,02 0,35 1,67 0,33 
p-value 0,09 0,35 0,16 0,34 
¹ T-statistics are in parentheses, *p < 0,10, **p < 0,05, ***p < 0,01    
² p-value of regression is reported below the F-statistics     
³ R2 is the fraction of the sample variance of Yi explained by the regressors. 
⁴ The standard error of the regression (SER) estimates the standard deviation of the error term   . 
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We see from the regression on         that the coefficient on Lev1 has changed sign from 
positive to negative compared to the simple regression in Table 8. This is intuitive, as a 
higher debt-to-assets ratio is associated with negative abnormal returns. However, the 
coefficient is still not significant.     tells the same story as Table 8, namely that firms with a 
high current ratio (CA/CL) experience less negative AR after being downgraded. The 
coefficient is significant on the 5% level for        , but not significant in the event window 
         . There are no differences between the two expectation models when it comes to 
capital structure. The coefficient is also economically significant. Increasing the current 
ratio, e.g. from 1 to 2, will hamper the effect of a downgrade by 1.75 %, measured by 
abnormal returns. 1.75 % of the market value is obviously of economic interest. On the other 
hand, it is questionable how feasible it is to increase the current ratio by a factor of two.   
 
The two-sample t-test (Table 9) showed that a reclassification from investment grade to non-
investment grade yields negative abnormal returns for all event windows. After controlling 
for other explanatory factors, this is only evident for          . Moreover, the coefficient is 
not significant in any of the two models.  
 
The coefficient    is highly negative and significant in the event window          . This 
indicates that firms that are not placed on a negative outlook prior to a downgrade, 
experience significantly negative abnormal returns. The magnitude of the coefficient is huge, 
indicating a 12.9 % decline in equity value. Hence, additions to S&P CreditWatch give 
valuable information to investors and have both economic and statistical significant. The 
result is also evident from the market model, although only significant on the 10% level.  
The coefficient    is negative and significant in the announcement day. This is consistent 
with the two-sample t-test in Table 10. It indicates that credit rating downgrades within the 
non-investment grade classification yield negative abnormal returns and supports the 
argument for a conditional treatment of credit ratings. The coefficient is -0.0212 which is 
economically significant. The market model indicates the same results however, only on the 
10% level.  
In order to test joint hypotheses on multiple regression coefficients we use the F-statistics. 
Under the null hypothesis, all the coefficients    
 
    are zero, while the alternative 
hypothesis is that at least one of the coefficients are non-zero. Under the null hypothesis, the 
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F-statistics has a sampling distribution that is given by the     distribution
13
. The F-
statistics have very different values for the different event windows and depends on the 
expectation’s model. Based in the market adjusted return model, the F-statistics is 2.02 on 
the announcement day and significant on the 10% level. However, for the remaining 
windows, the F-statistics is not significant regardless of expectation model.  
   in a multiple regression model measures the proportion of variation in abnormal returns 
that is explained by the independent variables. The    varies between 0.12 and 0.20 and is 
highest on the announcement day. However, it is not meaningful to compare    between 
regression models in which the dependent variable is not the same or use different sets of 
observations as the estimation period. In general, the explanatory power of the model seems 
low. The    is an ambiguous measure and must be interpreted with caution. It does not, for 
example, tell whether the variables are significant, it says nothing about inference, if there 
are omitted variable bias or whether I have included the most appropriate variables.  
5.3.2 Credit Rating Upgrades 
The results from running regression (1) on upgrades are reported below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 q-restrictions 
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Table. 15 
Results from Ordinary Least Squares Estimation of (Cumulative) Abnormal Returns for 
Credit Rating Upgrades.  
Lev1 and Lev2 are proxies for capital structure. Reclass is meant to gauge the impact of being reclassified, 
either from investment grade to non-investments grade, or vice versa. Watch is a variable which captures 
(un)anticipation and Invest.grade is a variable which indicates level, i.e. what classification the firm gets after 
a change in credit rating. 
    ( ,𝑇) =  0 +  1   1 ,  +  2   2 ,  +  3        ,  
+  4      ,   +  5      .    𝑑  ,  +   ,  
 Market adjusted return model Market model 
    =0     ( 1.1)    =0     ( 1.1) 
 0 0,0215 
(1,82)* 
0,0155 
(0,56) 
0,0325 
(2,40)** 
0,0305 
(1,06) 
 1 -0,0245 
(-1,76)* 
-0,0391 
(-1,19) 
-0,0174 
(-1,13) 
-0,0101 
(-0,31) 
 2 -0,0030 
(-0,71) 
0,0086 
(0,87) 
-0,0116 
(-2,22)** 
-0,0087 
(-0,79) 
 3 -0,0033 
(-0,46) 
0,0121 
(0,73) 
-0,0023 
(-0,30) 
0,0015 
(0,09) 
 4 0,0013 
(0,26) 
-0,0005 
(-0,05) 
-0,0029 
(-0,60) 
-0,0044 
(-0,42) 
 5 -0,0012 
(-0,29) 
-0,0069 
(-0,57) 
0,0101 
(1,76)* 
-0,0069 
(-0,57) 
 2 0,15 0,20 0,30 0,05 
SER 0,0102 0,0241 0,0112 0,0238 
F( 5, 21) 0,82 1,18 1,84 0,95 
p-value 0,55 0,34 0,15 0,22 
¹ T-statistics are in parentheses, *p < 0,10, **p < 0,05, ***p < 0,01    
²  p-value of regression is reported below the F-statistics 
³ R2 is the fraction of the sample variance of Yi explained by the regressors. 
⁴ The standard error of the regression (SER) estimates the standard deviation of the error term   . 
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We see from the regression that the coefficient    is negative on the announcement day and 
in the event window        . However, it is only weakly significant (10% level) for      . 
This confirms the finding in Table 12, namely that firms with a high D/A ratio experience 
less significant abnormal returns in the case of upgrades. The magnitude of the coefficient is 
–0.0245, but has little economic significance. For example, a firm with an initial D/A ratio of 
0.5 would only experience 0.245%
14
 higher abnormal returns by reducing the D/A ratio to 
0.4. The market model gives the same sign on the coefficients, but yields no significant 
results. 
   gives ambiguous results, with both negative and positive sign. The only significant 
coefficient is for       according to the market model. The coefficient is -0.0116 and highly 
significant. This is counterintuitive, as one would expect firms with a high current ratio to 
experience positive AR in the case of upgrades. Hence, it is not meaningful to interpret any 
economic significance of the coefficient as it has no ground in economic theory.  
Furthermore, the coefficient    also gives vague results. The sign is negative for       in 
both models, and positive for            in both models. However, none of the results are 
significant. The sample of upgrades is only comprised of three reclassifications. The 
contradicting results are probably due to the small number of observations. 
The coefficient     yields about as inconclusive and nonsignificant results as   . The signs 
are both positive and negative for       in both models and negative for           . The 
two-sample t-test in section 5.2.3 did not give any significant results between upgrades 
preceded by positive outlooks and those which did not. Hence, the multiple regression 
confirm that credit rating outlooks do not seem to convey any information in the case of 
upgrades.   
The coefficient    is negative and insignificant for all event windows except for       
according to the market model. This confirms the two-sample t-test (5.2.4) that there is no 
difference in abnormal returns for firms classified as investment grade or non-investment 
                                                 
14 ΔY =   Δ  → ΔY = 0.0245*0.1 = 0.00245 (0.245%)  
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grade. However, the coefficient on       is 0.0101 and only significant on the 10% level 
according to the market model.  
The F-statistics have very different values for the different event windows and depend on the 
expectation’s model. The market model yields the highest F-statistics (1.84) on the 
announcement day but it is not significant. In general, the multiple regressions models seem 
to perform poorly when it comes to upgrades. The    varies between 0.05 and 0.30, and is 
highest on the announcement day. As mentioned earlier, one should not put too much 
emphasis on this measure, especially considering the diverging results and insignificant 
coefficients.   
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6. Conclusion 
This thesis investigates the effect of credit rating announcements on stock returns. I found 
that credit rating downgrades have a negative effect on stock returns, and upgrades have a 
positive effect, measured by cumulative abnormal returns. Hence, credit rating 
announcements convey new information. However, the information content of credit ratings 
seems to be most significant for downgrades. This is consistent with previous research, e.g. 
by Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992), Goh and 
Ederington (1993) and Hsueh and Liu (1992). The choice of expected return model did not 
alter the results. 
A simple regression analysis showed that firms that have a high current ratio prior do a 
downgrade experience less negative abnormal returns compared to firms with a low current 
ratio. In the case of upgrades, firms with a high net debt-to-assets ratio experience less 
positive excess returns compared to firms with a low net debt-to-assets ratio prior to an 
upgrade. Downgrades that result in a reclassification from investment grade to non-
investment grade yield significant negative abnormal returns in the post event window. 
Hence, a downgrade that affects the access to commercial papers and bond liquidity issues is 
incrementally significant. It was not possible to run the same test on upgrades due to the 
small sample size.  
I tried to gauge the market’s anticipation of a change in credit rating by examining 
downgrades (upgrades) preceded by negative (positive) credit rating outlooks and those 
which were not preceded by a negative (positive) outlook but did not get any significant 
results for upgrades. Plausible explanations could be that the proxy for anticipation is not 
suitable or that failing to account for other sources of information prior to the announcement 
renders the dummy variable useless. The sample of downgrades was too small to analyze. 
Moreover, I found that that downgrades for firms with non-investment grade rating yield 
more negative excess returns compared to downgrades for firms with investment grade 
rating. Hence, firms within different rating classes cannot be treated similarly and calls for a 
conditional treatment of ratings and emission risk. Similar results were obtained for 
upgrades, however only weakly significant.  
A multiple regression was used to model the relationship between cumulative abnormal 
returns and different independent variables. After controlling for other explanatory variables, 
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it is still evident that firms with a high current ratio prior to a downgrade experience less 
negative abnormal returns on the announcement day. In addition, downgrades that are not 
anticipated by the market experience negative abnormal returns. The results are both 
statistical and economically significant. The multiples regression on upgrades did not 
produce any significant results. Moreover, the regression produces ambiguous results and 
their interpretation is often counterintuitive. In general, the multiple regression model seems 
to perform poorly when it comes to upgrades and the explanatory power of the model is low. 
It would be desirable to perform the analysis on a larger sample, in order to obtain more 
robust results. Furthermore, in a more comprehensive study, it would be favourable to do a 
manual inspection of confounding effects to reduce the effect of outliers/noise in the sample. 
An interesting suggestion for further research could be to do a separate analysis of the results 
in bull and bear markets, that is, to investigate whether upgrades/downgrades and the 
explanatory variables are contingent on the general market conditions.  
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8. Appendix - Tables 
Table1a List of Issuers 
 
Table 1b List of Sample Industries 
 
Issuer Domicile Industry
Alfa Laval Sweden Capital Goods
Autoliv Sweden Automobiles & Components
Copenhagen Airports Denmark Transportation
Electrolux Sweden Consumer Products
Enitel Norway Telecom Services
Ericsson Sweden Information Technology
ISS Denmark Commercial & Professional Svc
L E Lundbergforetagen Sweden Finance
Norsk Hydro Norway Metals & Mining
Norske Skogindustrier Norway Paper & Forest Products
Novo Nordisk Denmark Health Care
Petroleum Geo-Services Norway Energy
Sandvik Sweden Capital Goods
SAS Sweden Transportation
SSAB Sweden Metals & Mining
Statoil Norway Energy
Stora Enso Sweden Paper & Forest Products
Swedish Match Sweden Consumer Products
TDC Denmark Telecom Services
Telenor Norway Telecom Services
TeliaSonera Sweden Telecom Services
Volvo Sweden Capital Goods
Yara International Norway Chemicals
Industry
Telecom Services 16 17 %
Capital Goods 11 12 %
Energy 11 12 %
Paper & Forest Products 11 12 %
Information Technology 10 11 %
Metals & Mining 7 8 %
Transportation 6 7 %
Automobiles & Components 5 5 %
Commercial & Professional Svc 4 4 %
Consumer Products 4 4 %
Chemicals 3 3 %
Health Care 3 3 %
Finance 1 1 %
Observations
 V 
Table 2 List of Issuers and Credit Rating Announcements 
 
 
Firm Date Action Rating Classification
Alfa Laval 28.04.08 Upgrade BBB+ Lower medium grade
Alfa Laval 28.11.03 Upgrade BBB Lower medium grade
Alfa Laval 11.06.02 Upgrade BBB- Lower medium grade
Autoliv 27.07.10 Upgrade BBB+ Lower medium grade
Autoliv 26.11.09 Upgrade BBB Lower medium grade
Autoliv 19.02.09 Downgrade* BBB- Lower medium grade
Autoliv 21.11.08 Downgrade BBB+ Lower medium grade
Autoliv 12.08.05 Upgrade A- Upper medium grade
Copenhagen Airports 25.02.10 Downgrade BBB- Lower medium grade
Copenhagen Airports 04.12.08 Downgrade BBB Lower medium grade
Copenhagen Airports 04.04.06 Downgrade BBB+ Lower medium grade
Electrolux 09.11.10 Upgrade BBB+ Lower medium grade
Electrolux 17.12.08 Downgrade BBB Lower medium grade
Enitel 27.08.01 Downgrade CCC- In default with little prospects for recovery
Enitel 29.08.01 Selective default SD Default
Enitel 11.07.01 Downgrade CCC Extremely speculative
Ericsson 15.06.07 Upgrade* BBB+ Lower medium grade
Ericsson 28.02.05 Upgrade** BBB- Lower medium grade
Ericsson 10.11.04 Upgrade BB+ Speculative
Ericsson 07.11.02 Downgrade BB Speculative
Ericsson 01.08.02 Downgrade** BB+ Speculative
Ericsson 22.07.02 Downgrade BBB- Lower medium grade
Ericsson 16.05.02 Downgrade BBB Lower medium grade
Ericsson 13.11.01 Downgrade BBB+ Lower medium grade
Ericsson 14.05.01 Downgrade A- Upper medium grade
Ericsson 30.01.01 Downgrade A Upper medium grade
ISS 30.05.08 Upgrade BB- Speculative
ISS 17.05.05 Downgrade* B+ Highly speculative
ISS 12.05.05 Downgrade*** BB+ Speculative
ISS 09.04.03 Upgrade BBB+ Lower medium grade
L E Lundbergforetagen 08.06.07 Upgrade A+ Upper medium grade
Norsk Hydro 19.11.10 Upgrade BBB Lower medium grade
Norsk Hydro 20.03.09 Downgrade BBB- Lower medium grade
Norsk Hydro 03.08.07 Downgrade** BBB Lower medium grade
Norsk Hydro 02.06.06 Downgrade A- Upper medium grade
Norske Skogindustrier 12.08.10 Downgrade B- Highly speculative
Norske Skogindustrier 17.02.10 Downgrade B Highly speculative
Norske Skogindustrier 19.05.09 Downgrade B+ Highly speculative
Norske Skogindustrier 21.04.08 Downgrade BB- Speculative
Norske Skogindustrier 28.01.08 Downgrade BB Speculative
Norske Skogindustrier 14.11.06 Downgrade** BB+ Speculative
Norske Skogindustrier 08.04.04 Downgrade BBB- Lower medium grade
Novo Nordisk 24.06.11 Upgrade A+ Upper medium grade
Novo Nordisk 13.06.07 Upgrade A Upper medium grade
Novo Nordisk 29.04.04 Upgrade A- Upper medium grade
Petroleum Geo-Services 02.12.10 Upgrade BB Speculative
Petroleum Geo-Services 10.07.06 Upgrade BB- Speculative
Petroleum Geo-Services 06.05.05 Upgrade B+ Highly speculative
Petroleum Geo-Services 30.07.03 Downgrade D Default
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Table 2 List of Issuers and Credit Rating Announcements (cont.) 
 
 
 
 
Petroleum Geo-Services 31.12.02 Downgrade* CC In default with little prospects for recovery
Petroleum Geo-Services 20.11.02 Downgrade* CCC+ Substantial risks
Petroleum Geo-Services 29.10.02 Downgrade* B Highly speculative
Petroleum Geo-Services 31.07.02 Downgrade*** BB- Speculative
Petroleum Geo-Services 19.01.01 Downgrade BBB- Lower medium grade
Sandvik 24.05.11 Upgrade BBB+ Lower medium grade
Sandvik 09.03.10 Downgrade* BBB Lower medium grade
Sandvik 02.03.09 Downgrade A- Upper medium grade
Sandvik 20.05.08 Downgrade A Upper medium grade
SAS 06.11.09 Downgrade B- Highly speculative
SAS 06.11.08 Downgrade* B Speculative
SAS 22.07.08 Downgrade BB- Speculative
SSAB 06.12.10 Downgrade** BB+ Speculative
SSAB 30.07.09 Downgrade BBB- Lower medium grade
SSAB 19.07.07 Upgrade BBB Lower medium grade
Statoil 03.08.07 Upgrade AA- High grade
Statoil 08.11.06 Upgrade A+ Upper medium grade
Stora Enso 14.05.09 Downgrade BB Speculative
Stora Enso 11.11.08 Downgrade** BB+ Speculative
Stora Enso 22.10.07 Downgrade BBB- Lower medium grade
Stora Enso 23.02.06 Downgrade BBB Lower medium grade
Swedish Match 25.10.07 Downgrade BBB Lower medium grade
Swedish Match 09.10.06 Downgrade BBB+ Lower medium grade
TDC 15.12.10 Upgrade*** BBB Lower medium grade
TDC 14.06.10 Upgrade BB Speculative
TDC 11.04.06 Downgrade BB- Speculative
TDC 26.01.06 Downgrade*** BB Speculative
TDC 13.03.03 Downgrade BBB+ Lower medium grade
TDC 19.03.02 Downgrade A- Upper medium grade
Telenor 30.06.09 Upgrade A- Upper medium grade
Telenor 01.08.06 Downgrade BBB+ Lower medium grade
Telenor 23.01.02 Downgrade A- Upper medium grade
Telenor 16.01.01 Downgrade A Upper medium grade
TeliaSonera 28.10.05 Downgrade A- Upper medium grade
TeliaSonera 05.02.03 Downgrade A Upper medium grade
TeliaSonera 18.04.02 Downgrade A+ Upper medium grade
Volvo 15.04.11 Upgrade BBB Lower medium grade
Volvo 15.03.10 Downgrade BBB- Lower medium grade
Volvo 06.08.09 Downgrade BBB Lower medium grade
Volvo 29.04.09 Downgrade BBB+ Lower medium grade
Yara International 04.10.07 Downgrade BBB Lower medium grade
Yara International 20.12.05 Upgrade BBB+ Lower medium grade
Yara International 30.11.04 Upgrade BBB Lower medium grade
* More than one notch
** Reclassification
*** More than one notch and reclassification
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for Upgrades and Downgrades 
 
 
Table 4 The Effects of Winsorizing on Statistical Properties 
 
 
AAR (t=0) CAAR(t=-1,1) CAAR(t=0,5) CAAR(t=-5,0) AAR (t=0) CAAR(t=-1,1) CAAR(t=0,5) CAAR(t=-5,0)
Mean 0,0042 0,0094 0,0039 0,0032 -0,0158 -0,0164 -0,0234 -0,0245
Median 0,0029 0,0062 0,0056 -0,0021 0,0000 -0,0023 -0,0073 -0,0050
Std.dev 0,0100 0,0245 0,0227 0,0418 0,0615 0,0795 0,0951 0,0890
Kurstosis 0,38 -1,08 -0,94 0,16 3,53 1,13 1,38 0,42
Skewness 0,84 0,27 0,01 -0,38 -1,99 -0,97 -1,30 -0,97
Min -0,0092 -0,0285 -0,0348 -0,0909 -0,1951 -0,2092 -0,2681 -0,2273
Max 0,0269 0,0525 0,0420 0,0674 0,0471 0,1178 0,1038 0,1052
Upgrades Downgrades
before after before after before after before after
R(t=0) 0,0066 0,0055 0,0169 0,0127 2,0191 0,8419 8,1518 3,0455
AR(t=0) 0,0048 0,0042 0,0126 0,0100 1,6029 0,7997 6,4883 3,1194
CAR(t=-1,1) 0,0093 0,0094 0,0246 0,0245 0,2461 0,2513 1,9113 1,8947
CAR(t=0,5) 0,0021 0,0039 0,0276 0,0227 -1,0097 0,0094 4,9883 2,0168
CAR(t=-5,0) 0,0039 0,0032 0,0437 0,0418 -0,2336 -0,3598 3,0840 2,9371
Std.dev Skewness Kurtosis
Upgrades
Mean
before after before after before after before after
R(t=0) -0,0418 -0,0208 0,1679 0,0655 -5,0674 -1,8252 29,5432 2,9164
AR(t=0) -0,0380 -0,0158 0,1685 0,0615 -5,2441 -1,9941 31,1490 3,5337
CAR(t=-1,1) -0,0573 -0,0240 0,2405 0,1010 -3,7441 -1,7707 14,3111 3,5703
CAR(t=0,5) -0,0533 -0,0234 0,2393 0,0951 -4,1850 -1,2959 20,1311 1,3787
CAR(t=-5,0) -0,0523 -0,0283 0,1987 0,0987 -3,7631 -1,2857 16,2482 1,3478
Std.dev Skewness Kurtosis
Downgrades
Mean
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Table 5 Rating Categories 
 
 
Table 6 Distribution of Up/Downgrades across Rating Classification 
 
 
Rating Category Grade
AAA Prime 1
AA+
AA
AA-
A+
A
A-
BBB+
BBB
BBB-
BB+
BB
BB-
B+
B
B-
CCC+ Substantial risks
CCC Extremely speculative
CCC-
CC
SD Default
7
In default with little prospects for recovery
8
Lower medium grade 4
Speculative 5
Highly speculative 6
High grade 2
Upper medium grade 3
Rating Class
Prime 0 0 % 0 0 %
High grade 1 3 % 0 0 %
Upper medium grade 7 23 % 11 18 %
Lower medium grade 16 53 % 25 40 %
Speculative 5 17 % 14 23 %
Highly speculative 1 3 % 6 10 %
Substantial risks 0 0 % 1 2 %
Extremely speculative 0 0 % 1 2 %
In default with little prospects for recovery 0 0 % 2 3 %
(Selective)Default 0 0 % 2 3 %
Upgrades Downgrades
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9. Appendix – Figures  
Figure 1a Frequency of Sample Upgrades and Downgrades over Time 
 
Figure 1b Frequency of Sample Upgrades and Downgrades over Time 
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